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Abstract
The goal of this dissertation is to investigate the impact of the American Institute of
Certified Public Accountants’ (AICPA) recently adopted cybersecurity risk management
examination on investor perceptions and decisions. The dissertation implements a two-essay
approach.
Essay 1 examines the effect of voluntary disclosures of joint or separate provisioning of
cybersecurity risk management examinations on investor perceptions and decisions, and whether
these effects differ when a subsequent cybersecurity incident occurs. Conducting a 2 x 2
between-participants experiment, I find that the negative signal of a subsequent cybersecurity
incident reverses investors’ positive perceptions of auditor competence and increases investors’
sensitivity to potential independence impairments when the cybersecurity risk management
examination is jointly provisioned, leading to lower perceptions of audit quality. I also find that
investors are less willing to invest when the cybersecurity risk management examination is
jointly compared to separately provisioned. My results provide important insights to regulators
and standard setters who have raised concerns regarding the importance of addressing
cybersecurity risk in the integrated internal control over financial reporting and financial
statements audits and the potential for independence impairments from increased auditor
performed non-audit services such as cybersecurity. My study also contributes to the non-audit
services literature not only by examining a unique and emerging non-audit service not previously
examined, but also by showing that non-audit services are perceived differently depending on
whether a negative signal of non-audit service quality is present.
v

Essay 2 examines the effect of the type of cybersecurity assurance service on investor
perceptions and decisions and whether these effects differ when a prior cybersecurity incident is
reported. Conducting a 2 x 2 between-participants experiment, I find that investors are more
willing to invest and have higher perceptions of management credibility when voluntary
disclosures include a cybersecurity risk management examination compared to a less
comprehensive cybersecurity assurance service. These findings are important because public
company boards are increasingly looking to audit firms to provide cybersecurity assurance
services. I also find that investors perceive cybersecurity risk management examinations to
provide higher assurance quality regarding an organization’s ability not only to prevent future
cybersecurity incidents, but also to recover from future cybersecurity incidents that are not
prevented - a key risk management issue raised by regulators. My study also contributes to the
voluntary assurance disclosure literature by examining investor reactions to management
disclosures of alternative types of voluntary external cybersecurity assurance services, beyond a
comparison of the absence or presence of external assurance reports provided by CPAs
previously examined in other non-financial voluntary assurance settings. I also find that
management’s choice to acquire a more comprehensive cybersecurity assurance service has a
positive effect on investors’ perceptions of management credibility, which in turn has a positive
effect on investors’ willingness to invest.
This dissertation contributes to the growing literature related to cybersecurity. Most of
this work has been archival in nature and as such, has not been able to examine the effects of the
AICPA’s recently adopted cybersecurity risk management examination reporting. Using an
experimental method, I am able to examine important implications of voluntary cybersecurity
risk management examination reporting and present opportunities for future research.

vi

Chapter 1. Dissertation Overview
1.1 Overall Motivation
With the goal of providing more complete and useful information to investors, the
Securities and Exchange Committee (SEC) recently issued guidance for public company
cybersecurity risk and incident disclosures including information about cybersecurity risk
management programs and preventative actions taken to reduce cybersecurity risks (SEC 2018a).
In response to increased cybersecurity risk and the growing demand for information about how
organizations are managing cybersecurity risk, the American Institute of Certified Public
Accountants (AICPA) recently released a new cybersecurity risk management examination
service designed to provide external assurance related to the effectiveness of an organization’s
cybersecurity risk management program (AICPA 2017a). A cybersecurity risk management
program is “a set of policies, processes, and controls designed to protect information and systems
from security events that could compromise the achievement of the entity’s cybersecurity
objectives and to detect, respond to, mitigate, and recover from, on a timely basis, security events
that are not prevented” (AICPA 2017b, 207).
The AICPA’s new cybersecurity risk management examination service provides a
general-use report intended to benefit a broad range of potential users including investors
(AICPA 2017a); however, it is unclear how nonprofessional investor perceptions and decisions
will be impacted by organizations’ voluntary cybersecurity risk management examination
disclosures. In addition, cybersecurity incidents are often highly publicized in the news, are
increasing, and are required to be disclosed if material (SEC 2011, 2017a). It is possible that an
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organization’s disclosure of a significant cybersecurity incident could impact investor reactions
to that organization’s voluntary cybersecurity risk management examination disclosure. As
such, the overall goal of this dissertation is to investigate the impact of voluntary cybersecurity
risk management examination disclosures on investor perceptions and decisions.
1.2 Overview of the Two Essays
Figure 1.1 provides an overview of the dissertation and the relationships among the two
essays. Essay 1 and Essay 2 read as standalone essays and can be read in any order. The
dissertation examines the effects of three independent constructs: provisioning type,
cybersecurity incident, and type of cybersecurity assurance service. In Essay 1, provisioning
type is operationalized as joint provisioning or separate provisioning because cybersecurity risk
management examinations are classified as permitted non-audit services and organizations can
obtain cybersecurity risk management examination services from their existing financial
statement auditors, i.e., joint provisioning, or from a separate provider (U.S. Congress 2002; SEC
2003). Cybersecurity incident is operationalized in Essay 1 as the absence or presence of a
cybersecurity incident subsequent to a voluntary cybersecurity risk management examination
disclosure and in Essay 2 as the absence or presence of a cybersecurity incident prior to a
voluntary cybersecurity risk management examination disclosure. In Essay 2, type of
cybersecurity assurance service is operationalized as a more or less comprehensive assurance
service because cybersecurity assurance services can differ in terms of the comprehensiveness of
the subject matter (AICPA 2017b).
Essay 1 draws on source credibility theory (Birnbaum and Stegner 1979) and DeAngelo’s
(1981) theoretical audit quality model to develop hypotheses regarding the impact of
provisioning type and cybersecurity incident on investor perceptions and decisions. Essay 2
2

draws on dual processing theories (Chaiken 1980; Petty and Cacioppo 1986; Chaiken and
Maheswaran 1994; Kahneman 2003) and Mercer’s (2004) management disclosure framework to
develop hypotheses regarding the impact of type of cybersecurity assurance service and
cybersecurity incident on investor perceptions and decisions.
The remainder of the dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter 2 presents Essay 1 as
a standalone essay and Chapter 3 presents Essay 2 as a standalone essay. Chapter 4 concludes
the dissertation.
1.3 Figure of Dissertation Overview

Figure 1.1: Dissertation Overview
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Chapter 2. Essay 1: The Impact of Cybersecurity Risk Management Examinations and
Cybersecurity Incidents on Investor Perceptions and Decisions
2.1 Introduction
Cybersecurity risk is increasingly viewed as one of the most significant challenges facing
companies in the U.S. (KPMG 2018; PwC 2019). Cybercrime can result in reputational damage,
loss of intellectual property, disruption of business operations, government fines, and litigation
expenses (AICPA 2017a; CAQ 2016a). In response to these risks and the growing demand for
information about organizations’ cybersecurity risk management programs,1 the American
Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) has released a new examination-level
attestation service designed to provide assurance related to the effectiveness of organizations’
cybersecurity controls (AICPA 2017a). The cybersecurity risk management examination is a
voluntary, general-use report that is intended to benefit a broad range of potential users including
investors, directors, analysts, and regulators (AICPA 2017a; CAQ 2016a).2
Recent high-profile cybersecurity breaches at public companies (e.g., Target, Home
Depot, Sony) have heightened the general public’s and investors’ sensitivity to such incidents.
As public companies increasingly seek to provide voluntary cybersecurity risk management

1

A cybersecurity risk management program is a “…set of policies, processes, and controls designed to protect
information and systems from security events that could compromise the achievement of the entity’s cybersecurity
objectives and to detect, respond to, mitigate, and recover from, on a timely basis, security events that are not
prevented” (AICPA 2017b, 207).
2
System and Organization Controls (SOC) for Cybersecurity examinations include three components: (1)
management’s description of the cybersecurity risk management program, (2) management’s assertion that the
description is presented in accordance with the AICPA’s description criteria and the controls within the program
were effective based on the control criteria, AICPA’s Trust Services or alternatives, and (3) the CPA’s opinion on
management’s description and the effectiveness of the controls within the program (AICPA 2017a).
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examination disclosures, it is unclear how nonprofessional (retail) investors will perceive such
disclosures. Accordingly, the AICPA has called for research that explores how users respond to
cybersecurity risk management examination reporting (AAA 2017a, 2017b). Moreover, the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) is particularly concerned about cybersecurity
threats facing nonprofessional (retail) investors and the need for more robust cybersecurity
disclosures, including more information about organizations’ cybersecurity risk management
programs and preventative actions taken to reduce and manage cybersecurity risk (SEC 2017b,
2018a).
Cybersecurity risk management examinations are classified as permitted non-audit
services and organizations can obtain cybersecurity risk management examination services from
their financial statement auditors, i.e., joint provisioning, or from a separate provider (U.S.
Congress 2002; SEC 2003).3 Joint provisioning of cybersecurity risk management examinations
could potentially have both functional and dysfunctional effects on the work performed by the
audit firm. The work performed in cybersecurity risk management examinations overlaps with
the assurance work performed in integrated internal control over financial reporting (ICFR) and
financial statements audits and the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) has
emphasized the importance of auditors increasingly considering cybersecurity risks in the
integrated audits (PCAOB 2016, 2018).4 This overlap between cybersecurity risk management

3

With the goal of improving auditor independence and financial reporting quality, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002
(SOX) and related Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) rules: (1) banned audit firms from providing certain
non-audit services such as financial information system design and implementation and internal audit services to
audit clients; (2) increased disclosure requirements related to audit and non-audit services fees; and (3) required
audit committees to pre-approve both audit and permitted non-audit services (U.S. Congress 2002; SEC 2003).
There is no prohibition in SOX against the independent auditor also providing cybersecurity examination services.

4

Not only is an understanding of the client’s business processes and information systems important in both
cybersecurity examinations and ICFR audits, many entity-level controls, e.g., control environment, risk assessment
procedures, monitoring, general computer controls, etc., are also important to understand and test in both
cybersecurity examinations and ICFR audits. PCAOB staff inspection briefs continue to highlight concerns about
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examinations and the integrated audits and increased importance of cybersecurity risk in the
integrated audits creates an opportunity for increased auditor competence from knowledge
spillover effects and from making it more cost-effective to use specialists who are more
competent. The potential synergy between cybersecurity risk management examinations and the
integrated audits is thus a functional effect of joint provisioning.
On the other hand, the Investor Advisory Group of the PCAOB has raised concerns that
the rise of non-audit services, including cybersecurity services, in the large public auditing firms
is threatening auditor independence and increasing risks to nonprofessional investors (PCAOB
2014). Joint provisioning of cybersecurity risk management examinations could result in a
dysfunctional effect if investors perceive an impairment in auditor independence from providing
the non-audit service. Given the overlap between cybersecurity risk management examinations
and the integrated ICFR and financial statements audits that may result in increased auditor
competence and the concern about auditor independence impairments, the cybersecurity context
provides an interesting setting to examine investor perceptions of the functional and
dysfunctional effects of joint provisioning. In this study, I investigate the effect of joint
compared to separate provisioning of cybersecurity risk management examinations on investor
perceptions and decisions.
The cybersecurity risk management examination context is also of interest given the
potential for a subsequent cybersecurity incident5 and ensuing investor reactions. The
occurrence of a significant cybersecurity incident following a jointly provisioned cybersecurity
auditors’ procedures for assessing risks related to cybersecurity that could have an effect on the financial statements
audit and how these risks are addressed, i.e., how engagement teams modify their audit approach based on these
risks, including how changes are made to audit procedures to test ICFR (PCAOB 2016, 2018).
5
Cybersecurity incidents are often highly publicized in the news, are increasing, and are required to be disclosed if
material (SEC 2011, 2017a). The consequences of cybersecurity incidents to investors can be significant as
illustrated by Equifax’s stock falling 31% and losing over $5 billion in market value when the magnitude of
Equifax’s 2017 cybersecurity breach was disclosed (Reklaitis 2017; SEC 2018b).
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risk management examination could be perceived by investors as a negative signal not only of
the quality of the cybersecurity risk management examination but also of the integrated ICFR
and financial statements audits. In the event of a subsequent cybersecurity incident, investor
perceptions of the positive effects of increased competence from joint provisioning could be
outweighed by perceptions of the negative effects of independence impairment from joint
provisioning. I examine if the effect of a subsequent cybersecurity incident on investor
perceptions and decisions differs depending on whether the cybersecurity risk management
examination is provisioned jointly or separately.
Drawing on source credibility theory (Birnbaum and Stegner 1979), DeAngelo’s (1981)
theoretical audit quality model, and Wallace’s (1987) information hypothesis I develop
predictions for how and why joint provisioning and subsequent cybersecurity incidents impact
investor perceptions and decisions. I conduct an experiment using a 2 x 2 between-participant
design and manipulate (1) cybersecurity examination provisioning type as joint or separate and
(2) subsequent cybersecurity incident as a cybersecurity incident absent or present following the
cybersecurity risk management examination disclosure. I measure how my manipulations
impact investors’ willingness to invest (e.g., Koonce and Lipe 2010; Elliott, Rennekamp, and
White 2015; Asay, Libby, and Rennekamp 2018). To understand why my manipulations impact
willingness to invest, I measure perceptions of auditor independence (Beattie, Brandt, and
Fearnley 1999; Lowe, Geiger, and Pany 1999; SEC 2001), auditor competence (Bassellier,
Benbasat, and Reich 2003; AICPA 2016), and audit quality (Gaynor, Kelton, Mercer, and Yohn
2016; PCAOB 2007).
Consistent with my predictions that joint provisioning of the cybersecurity risk
management examination creates an opportunity for increased auditor competence from
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knowledge spillover effects, my results indicate that in the absence of a cybersecurity incident,
investors’ perceptions of auditor competence are greater when the cybersecurity risk
management examination is provisioned jointly compared to separately. I also find that when
the cybersecurity risk management examination is provisioned jointly, the negative signal of a
subsequent cybersecurity incident reverses investors’ positive perceptions of competence and
increases investors’ sensitivity to potential independence impairments. Overall, my results
indicate that investors are more willing to invest in a company when the cybersecurity risk
management examination is provisioned separately compared to jointly – a finding that has
important implications for public companies and their boards.
This study makes three contributions. First, I contribute to the growing literature related
to cybersecurity. Most of this work has been archival in nature and as such, has not been able to
examine the effects of the AICPA’s new cybersecurity risk management examination reporting.
Using an experimental method, I am able to examine a potentially important implication of how
cybersecurity risk management examinations are provisioned. Specifically, I find that investors
are less willing to invest when the cybersecurity risk management examination is jointly
compared to separately provisioned.
Second, this paper contributes to the research stream on non-audit services by not only
examining investor perceptions of joint provisioning of cybersecurity risk management
examinations, a unique and emerging non-audit service not previously examined, but also by
providing insights into the longstanding debate over the theorized competing (i.e., suppressing)
effects of increased competence and decreased independence on audit quality. Schneider,
Church, and Ely (2006) highlight that future research should focus on specific types of non-audit
services rather than the broad and varying non-audit services fee categories used in many prior
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studies providing mixed results. Interestingly, I find that the negative signal of a subsequent
cybersecurity incident reverses investors’ positive perceptions of competence and increases
investors’ sensitivity to potential independence impairments. Further, both competence and
independence perceptions have positive effects on perceptions of audit quality. These results
show that non-audit services are perceived differently depending on whether a negative signal of
non-audit service quality is present and highlight the importance of measuring perceptions of
both independence and competence when evaluating how non-audit services affect perceptions
of audit quality.
Third, this study contributes to purchasers of cybersecurity risk management
examinations and informs regulators and standard setters by examining investors’ reactions to
the AICPA’s recently adopted voluntary cybersecurity risk management examination reporting.
My results indicate that it might be advantageous for purchasers of cybersecurity risk
management examinations to provision the cybersecurity risk management examination
separately from the audit due to the negative effect of joint provisioning on investors’
willingness to invest – an important finding given that cybersecurity has become a top concern
for public companies and their boards (NACD 2017) who are looking to their auditors to provide
cybersecurity services both within and outside the scope of the integrated ICFR and financial
statements audits (AAA 2019). My findings also provide insights to regulators and standard
setters considering changes to the voluntary nature of provisioning guidelines of cybersecurity
risk management examinations. The PCAOB has emphasized the importance of auditors
increasingly considering components of cybersecurity in the integrated ICFR and financial
statements audits (PCAOB 2016, 2018), while also raising concerns that the rise of non-audit
services, including cybersecurity services, is threatening auditor independence in the large public
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auditing firms and increasing risks to nonprofessional investors (PCAOB 2014). Despite
investors’ perceptions of increased competence consistent with the opportunity for knowledge
spillover, in the event of a cybersecurity incident investors’ perceptions of audit quality is
reduced when the cybersecurity risk management examination is provisioned jointly.

2.2 Theory and Hypotheses Development

2.2.1 Background and Theoretical Foundation
In order to understand how and why the joint provisioning of cybersecurity risk
management examinations impacts investor perceptions and decisions I first discuss the debate in
the literature regarding the positive (functional) and potentially negative (dysfunctional) effects
of joint provisioning. I then present the expected theoretical relations that together explain the
overall effect of joint provisioning on investors’ willingness to invest.
On one hand, non-audit services are typically conjectured to impair auditor independence
in fact or appearance, presumably because the additional revenue increases the importance of the
client to the auditor, i.e., economic dependence, making it more likely that the auditor will agree
to management’s preferred positions, which in turn decreases audit quality (e.g., Frankel,
Johnson, and Nelson 2002; Kinney, Palmrose, and Scholz 2004; Krishnan, Heibatollah, and
Zhang 2005; Francis 2006; Francis and Ke 2006; Gaynor, McDaniel, and Neal, 2006; Khurana
and Raman 2006; Srinidhi and Gul, 2007). On the other hand, non-audit services are also
conjectured to increase auditor competency and efficiency, presumably through knowledge
spillover effects and increased use of specialists, which in turn increases audit quality (e.g.,
Simunic 1984; Whisenant, Sankaraguruswamy, and Raghunandan 2003; Kinney et al. 2004;
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Robinson 2008; Lai and Krishnan 2009; Gleason and Mills 2011; Knechel and Sharma 2011;
Krishnan and Yu 2011; Prawitt, Sharp, and Wood 2012; Koh, Rajgopal, and Srinivasan 2013).
In support of the effects of independence and competence on audit quality, the theoretical
model developed by DeAngelo (1981) explains that the quality of external assurance is impacted
by two factors, the independence and competence of the assurance provider. External assurance
providers who are more independent and more competent provide higher quality external
assurance. Similarly, source credibility theory posits that individuals evaluate the credibility of
an information source based on the potential bias from the source and the expertise of the source
(Birnbaum and Stegner 1979). Individuals’ use of credibility as a cognitive heuristic when
evaluating new information has been supported in psychology research (e.g., Hovland, Janis, and
Kelley 1953; Eagly, Wood, and Chaiken 1978; Chaiken and Maheswaran 1994) and in
accounting research (e.g., Hirst, Koonce, and Simko 1995; Hirst, Koonce, and Miller 1999;
Mercer 2004; Mercer 2005; DeZoort, Houston, and Hermanson 2003; Hodge, Hopkins, and Pratt
2006; Kim, Green, and Johnstone 2016). Together, the theoretical model developed by
DeAngelo (1981) and source credibility theory (Birnbaum and Stegner 1979) suggest that
individuals’ perceptions of assurance provider independence and competence are positively
related to perceptions of external assurance quality.
Consistent with Wallace’s (1987) information hypothesis stating that independent
assurance reduces information asymmetry and uncertainty, external assurance quality has a
positive impact on investor perceptions of the credibility of the subject matter and the extent to
which investors rely on the subject matter in making valuation judgments (e.g., Libby 1979;
Hodge 2001, Coram, Monroe, and Woodliff (2009). In other words, assurance quality is
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positively related to the extent to which investors react more positively to positive news and
more negatively to negative news in their valuation judgments (Coram et al. 2009).

2.2.2 The Effect of Jointly Provisioned Cybersecurity Examinations
Following this theoretical foundation and background about the effects of joint
provisioning of non-audit services, I expect that joint provisioning of cybersecurity risk
management examinations will have a positive effect on perceptions of auditor competence, a
negative effect on perceptions of auditor independence, and that perceptions of competence and
independence will in turn have positive effects on perceptions on audit quality, which is
positively related to valuation judgments (i.e., willingness to invest). While these individual
effects are supported directly by the theoretical foundation, it is less clear what the overall effect
of joint provisioning will be on willingness to invest due to the competing positive effect of
competence and negative effect of independence. To make an overall prediction about the effect
of joint provisioning on willingness to invest I next turn to prior literature.
Prior research examining whether the provision of other non-audit services is associated
with lower financial reporting and audit quality has yielded mixed results. On one hand, nonaudit services are associated with lower financial reporting quality, including accruals (Frankel et
al. 2002; Srinidhi and Gul, 2007) and restatements (Kinney et al. 2004), negative stock price
reactions (Krishnan et al. 2005; Francis and Ke 2006) and higher cost of equity (Khurana and
Raman 2006). These results are consistent with auditor independence impairments due to joint
provisioning having a stronger negative effect than the potential positive effect from increased
competence. On the other hand, research has found evidence of positive overall net effects
associated with joint provisioning such as increased financial reporting and audit quality
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(Robinson 2008; Gleason and Mills 2011), reduced audit reporting lags (Knechel and Sharma
2011), lower accounting risk (Prawitt et al. 2012), and improved earnings quality (Koh et al.
2013). These findings suggest that in some settings, the positive effect from increased
competence due to joint provisioning is stronger than the negative effect associated with auditor
independence impairments.
Schneider et al. (2006) suggests that the broad and varying non-audit services fee
categories used in many prior studies have contributed to the mixed results and that the specific
type of non-audit service and context is important. In the cybersecurity context, there is a
relatively substantial overlap between cybersecurity risk management examination procedures
and integrated audit procedures. In both cybersecurity risk management examinations and
integrated audits, an understanding of the client’s business processes and information systems is
important. Similarly, many entity-level controls, e.g., control environment, risk assessment
procedures, monitoring, general computer controls, etc., are important to understand and test in
both cybersecurity risk management examinations and integrated audits. Additionally, the
PCAOB staff inspection briefs continue to highlight concerns about auditors’ procedures for
assessing risks related to cybersecurity that could have an effect on the financial statements audit
and how these risks are addressed, i.e., how engagement teams modify their audit approach
based on these risks, including how changes are made to audit procedures to test ICFR (PCAOB
2016; 2018). Similarly, the Center for Audit Quality (CAQ) has also emphasized the importance
of auditors considering components of cybersecurity in the integrated audits (CAQ 2016b).6

6

The CAQ issued guidance explaining that “auditing standards require the auditor to obtain an understanding of
how the company uses IT and the impact of IT on the financial statements, the extent of the company’s automated
controls as they relate to financial reporting, including the IT general controls that are important to the effective
operation of automated controls, and the reliability of data and reports used in the audit that were produced by the
company. In assessing the risks of material misstatement to the financial statements—including IT risks resulting
from unauthorized access—auditors are required to take into account their understanding of the company’s IT
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The overlap between cybersecurity risk management examinations and integrated audits
and the increased importance of cybersecurity risk in the integrated audits provide a strong
opportunity for knowledge spillover. This overlap could result in greater synergy if a single firm
performs both services, which could make it more cost-effective to use specialists who are more
competent. This overlap also increases the likelihood that the same group or individuals perform
both services, resulting in greater knowledge spillover effects. Consequently, the positive effects
of having cybersecurity risk management examinations and integrated audits performed by the
same firm could be stronger than the positive effects of joint provisioning of some other nonaudit services.
To make a prediction as to whether perceptions of the positive effect associated with
competence improvements will outweigh perceptions of the negative effect associated with
independence impairments, I rely on Prawitt et al. (2012) who examine a setting where the
overlap between the non-audit service and the audit is substantial. Prawitt et al. (2012) show that
pre-SOX Big N internal audit outsourcing (i.e., joint provisioning of internal audit non-audit
services) is associated with lower accounting risk. I note that Prawitt et al. (2012) employ a
proxy for actual financial reporting and audit quality, whereas I measure investor perceptions,
and the overlap in an internal audit outsourcing setting might arguably be even greater than in the
cybersecurity risk management examination setting. Still, their findings suggest that the positive
effect from improvements in competence due to joint provisioning may be stronger than the
negative effect from auditor independence impairments.
Based on the strong opportunity for knowledge spillover, the increased importance of
cybersecurity risk in the integrated audits (PCAOB 2016, 2018; CAQ 2016b), and the findings in

systems and controls. If information about a material breach is identified, the auditor would need to consider the
impact on financial reporting, including disclosures, and the impact on ICFR” (CAQ 2016b, 1).
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Prawitt et al. (2012), I expect that when cybersecurity risk management examinations are jointly
provisioned the theorized positive effect on competence will outweigh the theorized negative
effect on independence. Drawing again on DeAngelo’s (1981) theoretical audit quality model
and source credibility theory (Birnbaum and Stegner 1979), I expect that, absent a cybersecurity
incident, investors will perceive joint provisioning, due to the expected stronger effect on
competence relative to independence, to result in perceptions of higher quality external
assurance. Drawing again on Wallace’s (1987) information hypothesis and prior literature (e.g.,
Libby 1979; Hodge 2001, Coram et al. 2009), perceptions of higher quality external assurance
will lead to higher valuations judgments (e.g., willingness to invest). My first hypothesis
follows:
H1: In the absence of a cybersecurity incident, investors will be more willing to invest
when the cybersecurity examination is jointly compared to separately provisioned.

2.2.3 The Impact of Subsequent Cybersecurity Incidents
Cybersecurity incidents are often highly publicized in the news, are increasing, and are
required to be disclosed if material (SEC 2011, 2017a). Cybersecurity incidents can be costly in
terms of remediation effort, system downtime, and damaged reputation and trust, which is likely
why prior research has demonstrated a negative market reaction to reported cybersecurity
incidents (e.g., Campbell, Gordon, Loeb, and Zhou 2003; Goel and Shawky, 2009; Gatzlaff and
McCullough, 2010; Hinz, Nofer, Schiereck, and Trillig 2015). Consistent with these archival
findings, I expect a negative effect of a cybersecurity incident on willingness to invest.
Additionally, a subsequent cybersecurity incident occurring after the issuance of the
cybersecurity risk management examination report can provide a negative external signal to
investors about external assurance quality. If provisioned separately, a subsequent cybersecurity
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incident should primarily provide a negative signal of cybersecurity risk management
examination quality given that the cybersecurity risk management examination is not performed
by the audit firm. However, when the cybersecurity risk management examination is jointly
provisioned, the signal could also reduce investors’ perceptions of the quality of the integrated
audit work. More specifically, I expect that a subsequent cybersecurity incident will send a
negative signal of external assurance quality, increasing investors’ sensitivity to potential
independence impairments and reducing investors’ perceptions of auditor competence, with
these effects being revealed through a lower willingness to invest.
Drawing again on DeAngelo’s (1981) theoretical audit quality model and source
credibility theory (Birnbaum and Stegner 1979), in the event of a subsequent cybersecurity
incident I expect that the negative signal of a subsequent cybersecurity incident will have a
greater negative effect on investors’ perceptions of auditor competence and independence,
resulting in a greater negative effect on perceptions of external assurance quality, when the
cybersecurity risk management examination is provisioned jointly compared to separately.
Drawing again on Wallace’s (1987) information hypothesis and prior literature (e.g., Libby
1979; Hodge 2001, Coram et al. 2009), perceptions of external assurance quality will impact
valuations judgments (e.g., willingness to invest). Based on this discussion, I present the
following hypotheses:
H2a: A subsequent cybersecurity incident will negatively impact willingness to invest.
H2b: A subsequent cybersecurity incident will have a negative effect on the relation
between provisioning type and willingness to invest.
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2.2.4 Perceptions of Competence, Independence, and Audit Quality
Figure 2.1 presents my model of how jointly provisioned cybersecurity risk management
examinations in the presence or absence of a cybersecurity incident affect investors’ willingness
to invest through the perceptual variables of auditor competence, auditor independence, and audit
quality. I next explain my hypotheses in relation to this model.
Perceptions of Competence and Independence. The theoretical model developed by
DeAngelo (1981) explains that the quality of external assurance is impacted by primarily two
factors, the competence and independence of the assurance provider. Similarly, source
credibility theory posits that individuals evaluate the credibility of an information source based
on the potential bias from the source and the expertise of the source (Birnbaum and Stegner
1979). Consistent with DeAngelo (1981) and source credibility theory (Birnbaum and Stegner
1979), the longstanding debate over non-audit services has also focused primarily on two
competing factors: competence and independence. On one side of the debate, non-audit services
increase auditor competence through knowledge spillover effects, while on the other side of the
debate non-audit services impair auditor independence through economic dependence (e.g.,
Schneider et al. 2006). Similar to some prior research on other non-audit services finding
positive effects of joint provisioning (e.g., Prawitt et al. 2012), the cybersecurity risk
management examination setting provides a strong opportunity for knowledge spillover due to
the overlap between the cybersecurity risk management examination and the integrated ICFR
and financial statements audits. As discussed earlier and as conjectured earlier by research
examining the net effect of non-audit services, I expect that investors will perceive joint
provisioning to increase auditor competence (Robinson 2008; Lai and Krishnan 2009; Gleason
and Mills 2011; Knechel and Sharma 2011; Prawitt et al. 2012; Koh et al. 2013) and that
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investors will perceive joint provisioning to impair independence due to increased economic
dependence on the client (Krishnan et al. 2005; Francis 2006; Francis and Ke 2006; Gaynor et al.
2006; Khurana and Raman 2006; DeFond and Zhang 2014). Accordingly, I present the
following hypotheses:
H3a: In the absence of a cybersecurity incident, perceptions of competence will be
greater when the cybersecurity examination is jointly compared to separately
provisioned.
H3b: In the absence of a cybersecurity incident, perceptions of independence will be
lower when the cybersecurity examination is jointly compared to separately
provisioned.
The Effect of a Subsequent Cybersecurity Incident. When the cybersecurity risk
management examination is jointly provisioned, I expect that a subsequent cybersecurity incident
will send a negative signal of not only the cybersecurity risk management examination, but also
of the integrated ICFR and financial statements audits. Drawing again on DeAngelo’s (1981)
theoretical audit quality model and source credibility theory (Birnbaum and Stegner 1979) I
expect that investors will associate this negative signal with lower auditor competence and
independence when the cybersecurity risk management examination is jointly provisioned. That
is, investors will no longer perceive a positive effect of knowledge spillover from joint
provisioning and will also be more sensitive to independence impairment concerns from joint
provisioning. Therefore, I propose the following hypotheses:
H4a: A cybersecurity incident will have a negative effect on the relation between
provisioning type and investors’ perceptions of auditor competence.
H4b: A cybersecurity incident will have a negative effect on the relation between
provisioning type and investors’ perceptions of auditor independence.
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Perceptions of Audit Quality. The theoretical model developed by DeAngelo (1981)
posits that the quality of external assurance is impacted by two factors, the independence and
competence of the assurance provider. Similarly, source credibility theory posits that individuals
evaluate the credibility of an information source based on the potential bias from the source and
the expertise of the source (Birnbaum and Stegner 1979). Together, the theoretical model
developed by DeAngelo (1981) and source credibility theory (Birnbaum and Stegner 1979)
suggest that individuals’ perceptions of assurance provider independence and competence are
positively related to perceptions of external assurance quality. Although prior studies have not
directly measured individual investors’ perceptions of both independence and competence and
their effect on perceptions of audit quality, some support for these associations has been found in
prior research (e.g., Swanger and Chewning 2001; Schneider et al. 2006; Prawitt, Smith, and
Wood 2009; DeFond and Zhang 2014; Abbott, Daugherty, Parker, and Peters 2016).
Accordingly, I present the following hypotheses:
H5a: Perceptions of competence are positively associated with perceptions of audit
quality.
H5b: Perceptions of independence are positively associated with perceptions of audit
quality.
Consistent with Wallace’s (1987) information hypothesis stating that independent
assurance reduces information asymmetry and uncertainty, external assurance quality has a
positive impact on investor perceptions of the credibility of the subject matter and the extent to
which investors rely on the subject matter in making valuation judgments (e.g., Libby 1979;
Hodge 2001, Coram et al. 2009). In other words, assurance quality is positively related to the
extent to which investors react more positively to positive news and more negatively to negative
news in their valuation judgments (Coram et al. 2009). Given the positive news in my study, I
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expect that perceptions of higher quality external assurance will lead to higher valuation
judgments (e.g., willingness to invest). Therefore, I present the last hypothesis:
H6: Perceptions of audit quality are positively associated with willingness to invest.
2.3 Research Method

2.3.1 Participants
Participants are 106 M.B.A. and executive M.B.A. students at a major public university. 7
On average, participants are 31 years old with 9.1 years of work experience. Close to 52 percent
of participants are female and 15 percent are executive M.B.A.s. On average, participants have
taken 3.8 accounting and finance courses and have purchased or sold individual stock or mutual
funds 19.3 times. Thus, the participants are appropriate proxies for nonprofessional investors.
Further, 100 (95) percent of participants have made online (in-department store) purchases in the
last three months and close to 47 percent of the participants have experienced online fraud or
identity theft in the past. Participants were randomly assigned across experimental conditions
and spent on average 12.85 minutes on the experiment.8 Twelve (out of 106) participants that
failed one or both of the manipulation check questions are included in my analyses as the results
remain qualitatively similar if the participants are excluded.

2.3.2 Experimental Task and Design
I conduct an experiment using a 2 x 2 between-participant design and manipulate (1)
cybersecurity examination provisioning type as joint or separate and (2) subsequent

7

Institutional Review Board approval was obtained prior to recruiting participants and collecting data.
Participants in the four experimental conditions do not vary significantly along any of the demographic factors. As
a robustness check, I include all demographic factors, including investment experience and whether the participant is
an M.B.A. or executive M.B.A. student, as covariates in my analyses, yielding qualitatively similar results.
8
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cybersecurity incident as cybersecurity incident absent or present following the cybersecurity
risk management examination disclosure. The experiment is administered online through the
Qualtrics software. In step one, participants are presented with general background information
about a fictitious company and a brief overview of stock and performance information, including
sales, earnings, and analyst expectations. The financial information is designed to be perceived
as positive. The participants are also provided information about the audit engagement,
including the clean audit opinion and background information about the auditors. The retail
industry setting is held constant. Comprehension check questions are used to ensure that
participants attend to and understand the background information. Participants are then asked to
provide initial valuation judgments about investment attractiveness and investment likelihood.
In step two of the experiment, the participants are first presented with information about
the company’s decision to disclose information about their cybersecurity risk management
program, the decision to hire an independent auditor to provide a cybersecurity risk management
examination, the disclosure, and the cybersecurity risk management examination report. The
participants are randomly presented one of the four experimental conditions based on the two
between-participant manipulations: (1) Joint Provision and No Cybersecurity Incident, (2)
Separate Provision and No Cybersecurity Incident, (3) Joint Provision and Subsequent
Cybersecurity Incident, and (4) Separate Provision and Subsequent Cybersecurity Incident. The
cybersecurity examination provisioning type manipulation (joint or separate provisioning) is
administered in this step. To make the manipulation salient, participants are explicitly told
whether the service was performed by the existing integrated ICFR and financial statement
auditors or by another Big 4 accounting firm. The subsequent cybersecurity incident
manipulation is also administered in this step. In the no cybersecurity incident conditions, the
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participants are explicitly told that, as of a particular date subsequent to the cybersecurity
assurance report disclosure, no significant cybersecurity incident has occurred. In the
cybersecurity incident conditions, participants are instead told that, on a particular date (the same
date as in the no incident conditions) subsequent to the cybersecurity risk management
examination disclosure, a significant cybersecurity incident occurred.
Participants are then asked to again provide valuation judgments about investment
attractiveness and investment likelihood. Participants also answer questions related to their
perceptions of competence, independence, and audit quality. In step three, participants answer
post-experiment questions, including demographic and manipulation check questions.

2.3.3 Dependent Variable
Willingness to Invest. I draw on prior research (e.g., Koonce and Lipe 2010; Elliott et al.
2015; Asay et al. 2018) to create my valuation judgment measures. Specifically, I use
participants’ willingness to invest in the fictitious company Cost Saver as my dependent variable.
I measure willingness to invest based on the average of participants’ perceptions of investment
attractiveness and investment likelihood. To measure investment attractiveness, I ask
participants how attractive an investment in Cost Saver is on a 7-point Likert scale anchored on 1
(very unattractive) and 7 (very attractive). To measure investment likelihood, I ask participants,
assuming they were given $10,000 to invest in the department store retail industry, how likely
are they to invest a portion of this amount in Cost Saver on a 7-point Likert scale anchored on 1
(very unlikely) and 7 (very likely). I capture participants’ willingness to invest both before and
after the experimental manipulations. To remove noise introduced by individual participant
idiosyncrasies, I control for pre-manipulation willingness to invest by using the difference
between the post-manipulation and pre-manipulation measures as the dependent variable, similar
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to prior research (e.g., Smith 2012, Asay et al. 2018; Koonce, Leitter, and White 2018). A
positive change in willingness to invest between the pre- and the post-manipulation measures
indicates an increased willingness to invest. For ease of exposition, I refer to the change in
willingness to invest simply as willingness to invest.

2.3.4 Other Measured Variables
Perceptions of Independence. I define auditor independence as “a mental state of
objectivity and lack of bias (SEC 2001,1) and “acting with integrity and objectivity and being
able to withstand pressure from management to infringe professional standards" (Beattie et al.
1999, 79).9 Following Lowe et al. (1999), I measure perceptions of independence by asking
participants how confident they are that the auditors acted independently when performing Cost
Saver's financial statements and related internal controls audit, using a 7-point Likert scale
anchored on 1 (No Confidence) and 7 (Extreme Confidence). I also provide a definition of
auditor independence to the participants: auditors are independent when they act with integrity
and objectivity, and without biases, and when they do not give in to pressure from management.
Perceptions of Competence. I define competence as a construct consisting of knowledge
and the ability to use this knowledge in a specific context (Bassellier et al. 2003). Competence is
similar to professional judgment, which is defined by the AICPA’s auditing standards as “the
application of relevant training, knowledge, and experience, within the context provided by
auditing, accounting, and ethical standards, in making informed decisions about the courses of

9

This definition of auditor independence is consistent with the AICPA’s auditing standards stating: “The auditor's
independence from the entity safeguards the auditor's ability to form an audit opinion without being affected by
influences that might compromise that opinion. Independence enhances the auditor's ability to act with integrity, to
be objective, and to maintain an attitude of professional skepticism. Independence implies an impartiality that
recognizes an obligation to be fair not only to management and those charged with governance of an entity but also
users of the financial statements who may rely upon the independent auditor's report” (AICPA 2016, 93).
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action that are appropriate in the circumstances of the audit engagement.” (AICPA 2016, 86). I
measure perceptions of competence by asking participants how confident they are in the
auditors’ competence in Cost Saver's financial statements and related internal controls audit, on a
7-point Likert scale anchored on 1 (No Confidence) and 7 (Extreme Confidence). I also provide
a definition of auditor competence to the participants: Auditors are competent when they have
relevant knowledge and the ability to use this knowledge in a specific auditing context.
Perceptions of Audit Quality. I develop my measure of perceptions of the quality of the
integrated ICFR and financial statements audits based on Gaynor et al.’s (2016) definition of a
high-quality audit as “…one that provides a higher level of assurance that the auditor obtained
sufficient appropriate evidence that the financial statements faithfully represent the firm’s
underlying economics” and a high-quality non-financial audit as “…one that is conducted in
compliance with assurance standards and provides a greater level of assurance on the respective
information opined” (5). Using 7-point Likert scales anchored on 1 (No Confidence) and 7
(Extreme Confidence), I ask participants how confident they are that sufficient evidence was
obtained and used to support: (1) the auditors’ clean opinion that the financial statements
faithfully represent Cost Saver’s underlying economics and (2) the auditors’ clean opinion that
Cost Saver maintained effective internal controls over financial reporting (PCAOB 2007). I then
combine these two measures for an overall measure of perceptions of the quality of the
integrated ICFR and financial statements audits.
2.3.5 Pilot Study
Participants were non-professional investors recruited from Amazon’s Mechanical Turk
(MTurk).10 Rennekamp (2012); Koonce, Miller, and Winchel (2015); Brasel, Doxey, Grenier

10

Institutional Review Board approval was obtained prior to recruiting participants and collecting data.
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and Reffett (2016), Chen, Han, and Tan (2016), and Farrell, Grenier, and Leiby (2017)
demonstrate the appropriateness of using Amazon’s Mechanical Turk participants in accounting
experiments. I enforced strict qualification requirements, including MTurk human intelligence
task (HIT) approval ratings greater than 98 percent on at least 5,000 approved HITs, participants
located in the U.S., and no duplicate IP addresses. In order to incentivize effort and attention, I
implemented a bonus payment structure as recommended by Buchheit, Doxey, Pollard, and
Stinson (2018). Participants earning a bonus took an average of 10.86 minutes to complete the
experiment. Close to 46 percent of participants were female and participants were on average 40
years old with 18.5 years of work experience. On average, participants had taken 2.2 accounting
and finance courses and had purchased or sold individual stock or mutual funds 17 times. Thus,
the participants were an appropriate proxy for non-professional investors. Participants had made
an average of 4-6 online purchases and 4-6 in-department store purchases in the last three
months and close to 28 percent of the participants had experienced online fraud or identity theft
in the past.
In summary, the results of the first experiment using MTurk participants showed that
joint provisioning had a negative effect on investor perceptions of independence, without a
corresponding positive effect on investor perceptions of competence. I also found that the effect
of a subsequent cybersecurity incident on investor perceptions of competence was significantly
more negative for joint provisioning compared to separate provisioning. The results of the first
experiment using MTurk participants also showed no statistical difference between investors’
willingness to invest between joint provisioning and separate provisioning of the cybersecurity
risk management examination.
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Based on feedback from several reviewers and lessons learned, I made a number of
changes after the first experiment using MTurk participants. Namely, prior to collecting new
data, I made changes to my manipulations to remove a potential priming effect, revised my
hypothesized model based on a more coherent and integrated theoretical framework, and
recruited M.B.A. and executive M.B.A. students with more investment experience than the
MTurk participants to participate in a new experiment with a modified instrument.
2.4 Results

2.4.1 Descriptive Statistics
Table 2.1 presents summary statistics for willingness to invest and perceptions of
competence, perceptions of independence, and perceptions of audit quality by condition as well
as mean comparisons between conditions. Similar to prior research (e.g., Smith 2012, Asay et al.
2018; Koonce, Leitter, and White 2018), willingness to invest is the change between the pre- and
the post-manipulation measures. A positive change in willingness to invest indicates an
increased willingness to invest.11 Interestingly, comparisons of means indicate that in the
absence of a subsequent cybersecurity incident, joint provisioning compared to separate
provisioning has a negative effect on willingness to invest, (p<0.001), but a positive effect on
perceptions of competence (p=0.077). Comparisons of means also indicate that in the presence
of a cybersecurity incident, joint provisioning compared to separate provisioning has a negative
effect on perceptions of independence (p=0.026) and perceptions of audit quality (p=0.082).
Additionally, comparisons of means indicate that a cybersecurity incident has a negative effect
on willingness to invest for both joint provisioning and separate provisioning (p<0.001 and

11

Results from alternative analyses using the post-manipulation measure as the dependent variable and the premanipulation measure as a covariate for hypotheses testing are qualitatively similar.
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p<0.001), and a negative effect on perceptions of competence (p<0.001); perceptions of
independence (p=0.001), and perceptions audit quality (p=0.005), but only for joint provisioning.

2.4.2 Tests of Hypotheses
Due to the strong opportunity for knowledge spillover effects and increased auditor
competence, H1 predicts that in the absence of a cybersecurity incident, investors will be more
willing to invest when the cybersecurity risk management examination is jointly provisioned
compared to separately provisioned. As shown in the ANOVA results in Table 2.2, investors are
significantly less willing to invest when the cybersecurity risk management examination is
jointly provisioned compared to separately provisioned (p=0.050; two-tailed), in the opposite
direction as my prediction. I explore this surprising result further when I test the links in my
hypothesized model shown in Figure 2.1.
H2a predicts that a subsequent cybersecurity incident will have a negative effect on
willingness to invest and H2b predicts that a subsequent cybersecurity incident will also have a
negative effect on the relation between joint provisioning and willingness to invest because a
subsequent cybersecurity incident will reduce investors’ perceptions of auditor independence and
competence when the services are jointly provisioned. As shown in the ANOVA results in Table
2.2, although I find a significant negative effect of a cybersecurity incident on willingness to
invest (p<0.001), I do not find a significant interaction (p=0.271). It is possible that because
investors already perceived joint provisioning as negative, the negative signal from a
cybersecurity incident did not further reduce investors’ perceptions of auditor independence and
competence under joint provisioning compared to under separate provisioning.
I next test my hypothesized model (H3 - H6) using PROCESS (Hayes 2018). The results
of the model tests are provided in Table 2.3 and depicted in Figure 2.2.
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Due to the strong opportunity for knowledge spillover effects and increased auditor
competence, H3a predicts that in the absence of a cybersecurity incident, perceptions of
competence will be greater when the cybersecurity risk management examination is jointly
provisioned compared to separately provisioned. As hypothesized, the results indicate that in the
absence of a cybersecurity incident, investors’ perceptions of auditor competence are more
positive when the cybersecurity risk management examination is jointly provisioned compared to
separately provisioned (p=0.047). I also find support for the prediction in H4a that a subsequent
cybersecurity incident has a negative effect on the relation between provisioning type and
perceptions of competence (p=0.020). The interaction suggests that when the cybersecurity risk
management examination is jointly provisioned, the negative signal of a subsequent
cybersecurity incident reverses investors’ positive perceptions of competence.
I do not find support for H3b, which predicts that in the absence of a cybersecurity
incident, perceptions of auditor independence are lower when the cybersecurity risk management
examination is jointly provisioned compared to separately provisioned (p=0.469). Absent a
cybersecurity incident, it appears that perceptions of independence, typically theorized to explain
why joint provisioning of non-audit services negatively affects perceptions of audit quality, does
not explain why investors are less willing to invest when the cybersecurity risk management
examination is jointly provisioned compared to separately provisioned.
I do, however, find support for H4b, which predicts that a subsequent cybersecurity
incident has a negative effect on the relation between provisioning type and perceptions of
independence (p=0.043). Further analysis indicates that when a cybersecurity incident is
reported, the effect of joint provisioning on investor perceptions of independence is negative
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(p=0.006), suggesting that investors are more sensitive to independence impairment concerns
from joint provisioning in the event of a subsequent cybersecurity incident.
The results also support H5a and H5b predicting that perceptions of competence and
perceptions of independence are positively associated with perceptions of audit quality (p<0.001
and p<0.001), and H6 predicting that perceptions of audit quality are positively associated with
willingness to invest (p<0.001).

2.4.3 Summary of Results
Table 2.4 provides a summary of my results. The results show that in the absence of a
subsequent cybersecurity incident investors are less willing to invest when the cybersecurity risk
management examination in jointly provisioned compared to separately provisioned (contrary to
H1). The results also show that a subsequent cybersecurity incident has a negative impact on
willingness to invest (H2a supported), but does not have a significant negative effect on the
relation between provisioning type and willingness to invest (H2b not supported).
I next explore whether my hypothesized model can help explain some surprising results.
In the absence of a subsequent cybersecurity incident, joint provisioning has a positive effect on
investors’ perceptions of auditor competence (H3a supported), but no significant effect on
perceptions of auditor independence (H3b not supported). Interestingly, the negative signal of a
subsequent cybersecurity incident reverses investors’ positive perceptions of competence (H4a
supported) and increases investors’ sensitivity to potential independence impairments (H4b
supported). Further, perceptions of competence and perceptions of independence have positive
effects on perceptions of audit quality (H5a and H5b supported) which in turn has a positive
effect on willingness to invest (H6 supported). Although the hypothesized model I developed
based on theory is largely supported by my results, it appears that investors’ willingness to invest
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is also driven by factors not captured in my model. My results suggest that the competing effects
of competence and independence typically theorized to explain the effect of joint provisioning on
various proxies of audit quality used in the non-audit services literature may not completely
explain nonprofessional investors’ judgment and decision making, at least in the context of
cybersecurity non-audit services.
2.5 Conclusion
In response to increased cybersecurity risks and the growing demand for information
about organizations’ cybersecurity risk management programs, the AICPA recently released a
cybersecurity risk management examination service designed to provide external assurance
related to the effectiveness of organization’s cybersecurity controls (AICPA 2017a). I report the
results of an experiment designed to respond to the AICPA’s call for research that explores how
users respond to cybersecurity risk management examination reporting (AAA 2017a; 2017b).
My study is also motivated by recently expressed concerns by the SEC about cybersecurity
threats facing nonprofessional (retail) investors and the need for more robust cybersecurity
disclosures, including more information about organizations’ cybersecurity risk management
programs and preventative actions taken to reduce and manage cybersecurity risk (SEC 2017b,
2018a).
Consistent with the theoretical argument that joint provisioning of the cybersecurity risk
management examination creates a strong opportunity for increased auditor competence from
knowledge spillover effects, my results indicate that in the absence of a cybersecurity incident,
investors’ perceptions of competence are greater when the cybersecurity risk management
examination is jointly compared to separately provisioned. I also find that when the
cybersecurity risk management examination is jointly provisioned, the negative signal of a
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subsequent cybersecurity incident reverses investors’ positive perceptions of competence and
increase investors’ sensitivity to potential independence impairments. My results also indicate
that investors are more willing to invest when the cybersecurity risk management examination is
separately provisioned compared to jointly provisioned.
This study makes three contributions. First, I contribute to the growing literature related
to cybersecurity. Most of this work has been archival in nature and as such, has not been able to
examine the effects of the AICPA’s new cybersecurity risk management examination reporting
and the AICPA’s call for research that explores how users respond to cybersecurity risk
management examination reporting (AAA 2017a, 2017b). Using an experimental method, I am
able to examine a potentially important implication of how cybersecurity risk management
examinations are provisioned. Specifically, I find that investors are less willing to invest when
the cybersecurity risk management examination is jointly provisioned compared to separately
provisioned.
Second, this paper contributes to the research stream on non-audit services by not only
examining investor perceptions of joint provisioning of cybersecurity risk management
examinations, a unique and emerging non-audit service not previously examined, but also by
providing insights into the longstanding debate over the theorized competing (i.e., suppressing)
effects of increased competence and decreased independence on audit quality. Schneider et al.
(2006) highlight that future research should focus on specific types of non-audit services rather
than the broad and varying non-audit services fee categories used in many prior studies providing
mixed results. In the absence of a subsequent cybersecurity incident, I find that joint
provisioning has a positive effect on investors’ perceptions of auditor competence, but no
significant effect on perceptions of auditor independence. Interestingly, the negative signal of a
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subsequent cybersecurity incident reverses investors’ positive perceptions of competence and
increases investors’ sensitivity to potential independence impairments. In other words, the effect
of joint provisioning can have either positive or negative effects on perceptions of competence
and either no significant effect or a negative effect on perceptions of independence depending on
whether a negative signal of the quality of the non-audit service is present. Further, as predicted
by theory, both perceptions of competence and perceptions of independence have positive effects
on perceptions of audit quality. These results not only contribute to the non-audit services
literature by showing how non-audit services are perceived differently depending on whether a
negative signal of non-audit service quality is present, but the results also highlight the
importance of measuring perceptions of independence and competence when examining how
non-audit services affect perceptions of audit quality.
Third, this study contributes to purchasers of cybersecurity risk management
examinations and informs regulators and standard setters by examining investors’ reactions to
the AICPA’s recently adopted voluntary cybersecurity risk management examination reporting.
My results indicate that it might be advantageous for purchasers of cybersecurity risk
management examinations to provision the cybersecurity risk management examination
separately from the audit due to the negative effect of joint provisioning on investors’
willingness to invest - an important finding given that cybersecurity has become a top concern
for public companies and their boards (NACD 2017) who are looking to their financial statement
auditors to provide cybersecurity services both within and outside the scope of the integrated
ICFR and financial statements audits (AAA 2019).
My findings also provide insights to regulators and standard setters considering changes
to the voluntary nature and provisioning guidelines of cybersecurity risk management
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examinations. The PCAOB has emphasized the importance of auditors increasingly considering
components of cybersecurity in the integrated ICFR and financial statements audits (PCAOB
2016, 2018) and public company auditors are concerned about investors’ increased expectations
of the responsibilities of the audit firm in addressing cybersecurity risk (McKenna 2018; AAA
2019). At the same time, the PCAOB has also raised concerns that the rise of non-audit services,
including cybersecurity services, is threatening auditor independence and increasing risks to
nonprofessional investors (PCAOB 2014). Similar independence concerns related to non-audit
services are being raised by regulators in the UK (CMA 2018). Moreover, the proposed law
H.R.5069 (2016), the Cybersecurity Systems and Risks Reporting Act of 2016, has been
introduced to amend the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and related SEC oversight to also apply to
cybersecurity systems and cybersecurity systems officers. Yet, my findings suggest that despite
investors’ perceptions of increased competence consistent with knowledge spillover effects, in
the event of a subsequent cybersecurity incident investors’ perceptions of audit quality is reduced
when the cybersecurity risk management examination is performed jointly. Given that
cybersecurity incidents are common and can occur despite clean opinions from high quality
cybersecurity risk management examinations, the increasing focus by regulators on cybersecurity
controls in integrated ICFR and financial statements audits may have unforeseen negative
effects, especially on nonprofessional investors that may misinterpret this less than perfect signal
of audit quality.
These observations should be interpreted in light of certain limitations, which also
provide opportunities for future research. First, similar to other nonprofessional investor
experimental studies, participants in my study have a limited set of information compared to
when investors make actual investment decisions, limiting the generalizability of the results.
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Future research could examine whether professional investors react differently than
nonprofessional investors to cybersecurity risk management examination and cybersecurity
incident disclosures. Second, I hold the retail industry constant in my study to control for
industry effects and make the setting more salient to the participants. Future research could
examine whether cybersecurity risk management examination and cybersecurity incident
disclosures impact investors’ perceptions and decisions differently by industry. Third, I do not
examine the perceived value of the AICPA’s new cybersecurity risk management examination
compared to alternative cybersecurity assurance services available in the current voluntary and
non-standardized cybersecurity assurance market and recommend that future research address
this important question. Fourth, although not within the scope of this study, future research
could also examine investors’ perceptions of CPAs’ expertise in the context of cybersecurity risk
management examinations.
Finally, although the hypothesized model I developed based on theory is largely
supported by my results, it appears that other non-modeled factors are also impacting investors’
willingness to invest. My results suggest that the competing effects of competence and
independence, typically theorized to explain the results of the net effects of joint provisioning on
various proxies of audit quality used in the non-audit services literature may not completely
explain nonprofessional investors’ judgment and decision making in the context of cybersecurity
non-audit services in particular and non-audit services in general, providing another opportunity
for future research.
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2.6 Tables for Essay 1
Table 2.1: Essay 1 Descriptive Statistics – Mean (Standard Deviation)
Cybersecurity
Examination
Provisioning Type

No Incident
Joint
Willingness to Invest
-0.250 (0.752)
Perceived Competence
5.731 (1.002)
Perceived Independence 5.269 (1.251)
Perceived Audit Quality 5.231 (1.125)
n = 26
Separate
Willingness to Invest
Perceived Competence
Perceived Independence
Perceived Audit Quality
Column Means
Willingness to Invest
Perceived Competence
Perceived Independence
Perceived Audit Quality

Willingness to Invest
Perceived Competence
Perceived Independence
Perceived Audit Quality

Mean
Comparison

Subsequent Cybersecurity
Incident
Incident

-2.056 (1.565) -1.170 (1.525)
4.370 (1.305) 5.038 (1.344)
4.037 (1.372) 4.642 (1.442)
4.241 (1.310) 4.726 (1.310)
n = 27
n = 53

0.463 (0.587) -1.654 (1.880)
5.148 (1.322) 4.808 (1.357)
5.296 (0.993) 4.923 (1.440)
5.111 (0.923) 4.885 (1.329)
n = 27
n = 26
0.113 (0.757)
5.434 (1.201)
5.283 (1.116)
5.170 (1.019)
n = 53
p-value
<0.001
0.077
0.931
0.673

Row Means

-0.575(1.736)
4.981 (1.337)
5.113 (1.235)
5.000 (1.135)
n = 53

p-value
<0.001
<0.001
0.001
0.005

<0.001
0.359
0.276
0.473

Grand Means
-1.858 (1.722) -0.873 (1.653)
4.585 (1.336) 5.009 (1.334)
4.472 (1.462) 4.877 (1.357)
4.557 (1.347) 4.863 (1.228)
n = 53
n = 106
p-value
0.401
0.237
0.026
0.082

Notes: All p-values are reported two-tailed.
Provisioning Type is manipulated as joint or separate provisioning of the cybersecurity examination and the
integrated ICFR and financial statements audits (joint=1; separate=0). Cybersecurity Incident is manipulated as the
presence or absence of a reported cybersecurity incident subsequent to the cybersecurity examination report date
(incident=1; no incident=0). Willingness to Invest is the change between the pre- and the post-manipulation
measures. A positive change in Willingness to Invest indicates an increased willingness to invest. Willingness to
Invest includes investment attractiveness and investment likelihood. Participants rate investment attractiveness on a
seven-point scale with endpoints “very unattractive” and “very attractive.” Participants rate investment likelihood on
a seven-point scale with endpoints “very unlikely” and “very likely.” Participants rate their confidence in the audit
firm’s (1) Independence, (2) Competence, and (3) Audit Quality on seven-point scales with endpoints “No
Confidence” and “Extreme Confidence.”
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Table 2.2: The Effect of Provisioning Type and Cybersecurity Incident on Willingness to
Invest
Panel A: ANOVA
Source

df

MS

F

1
1
1
102

8.229
101.889
0.642

4.792
59.340
0.374

Relation

df

F-stat

p-value

Separate > Joint for No Incident (H1)

1

3.921

0.050*

Provisioning Type
Cybersecurity Incident (H2a)
Provisioning Type X Cybersecurity Incident (H2b)
Error

p-value
0.031
< 0.001
0.271

Panel B: Planned Comparison

Notes: P-values are reported one-tailed when the path coefficient is in the expected direction, otherwise two-tailed.
Provisioning Type is manipulated as joint or separate provisioning of the cybersecurity examination and the
integrated ICFR and financial statements audits. Cybersecurity Incident is manipulated as the presence or absence of
a reported cybersecurity incident subsequent to the cybersecurity examination report date. Willingness to Invest is
the change between the pre- and the post-manipulation measures. A positive change in Willingness to Invest
indicates an increased willingness to invest. Willingness to Invest includes investment attractiveness and investment
likelihood. Participants rate investment attractiveness on a seven-point scale with endpoints “very unattractive” and
“very attractive.” Participants rate investment likelihood on a seven-point scale with endpoints “very unlikely” and
“very likely.”
*Result is significant in the opposite direction as predicted, two-tailed.

36

Table 2.3: Results of Hypothesized Model
Path
Provisioning Type  Perceived Competence (H3a)
Provisioning Type  Perceived Independence (H3b)
Provisioning Type and Cybersecurity Incident Interaction  Perceived Competence (H4a)
Provisioning Type and Cybersecurity Incident Interaction  Perceived Independence (H4b)
Perceived Competence  Perceived Audit Quality (H5a)
Perceived Independence  Perceived Audit Quality (H5b)
Perceived Audit Quality  Willingness to Invest (H6)

Coefficient

p-value

0.583
-0.027
-1.020
-0.859
0.437
0.401
0.384

0.047
0.469
0.020
0.043
<0.001
<0.001
<0.001

Notes: P-values are reported one-tailed when the path coefficient is in the expected direction, otherwise two-tailed.
Provisioning Type is manipulated as joint or separate provisioning of the cybersecurity examination and the integrated ICFR and financial statements
audits (joint=1; separate=0). Cybersecurity Incident is manipulated as the presence or absence of a reported cybersecurity incident subsequent to the
cybersecurity examination report date (incident=1; no incident=0). Willingness to Invest is the change between the pre- and the post-manipulation
measures. A positive change in Willingness to Invest indicates an increased willingness to invest. Willingness to Invest includes investment attractiveness
and investment likelihood. Participants rate investment attractiveness on a seven-point scale with endpoints “very unattractive” and “very attractive.”
Participants rate investment likelihood on a seven-point scale with endpoints “very unlikely” and “very likely.” Participants rate their confidence in the
audit firm’s (1) Independence, (2) Competence, and (3) Audit Quality on seven-point scales with endpoints “No Confidence” and “Extreme Confidence.”
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Table 2.4: Summary of Hypotheses Testing
Hypothesis
H1:
H2a:
H2b:
H3a:
H3b:
H4a:
H4b:
H5a:
H5b:
H6:

p-value

In the absence of a cybersecurity incident, investors will be more willing to invest when
0.050
the cybersecurity examination is jointly compared to separately provisioned.
A subsequent cybersecurity incident will negatively impact willingness to invest.
< 0.001
A subsequent cybersecurity incident will have a negative effect on the relation between
0.271
provisioning type and willingness to invest.
0.047
In the absence of a cybersecurity incident, perceptions of competence will be greater
when the cybersecurity examination is jointly compared to separately provisioned.
In the absence of a cybersecurity incident, perceptions of independence will be lower
0.469
when the cybersecurity examination is jointly compared to separately provisioned.
0.020
A cybersecurity incident will have a negative effect on the relation between provisioning
type and investors’ perceptions of auditor competence.
A cybersecurity incident will have a negative effect on the relation between provisioning
0.043
type and investors’ perceptions of auditor independence.
Perceptions of competence are positively associated with perceptions of audit quality.
<0.001
Perceptions of independence are positively associated with perceptions of audit quality.
<0.001
Perceptions of audit quality are positively associated with willingness to invest.
<0.001

Notes: P-values are reported one-tailed when the path coefficient is in the expected direction, otherwise two-tailed.
*Result is significant in the opposite direction as predicted, two-tailed.
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Result
Not Supported*
Supported
Not Supported
Supported
Not Supported
Supported
Supported
Supported
Supported
Supported

2.7 Figures for Essay 1

Figure 2.1: Hypothesized Model
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Figure 2.2: Hypotheses Results with Path Coefficients (p-values)
Notes: All p-values are reported one-tailed. Analyses are performed using PROCESS (Hayes 2018) with 5,000 bootstrap samples and 95% level of confidence.
Provisioning Type is manipulated as joint or separate provisioning of the cybersecurity examination and the integrated ICFR and financial statements audits
(joint=1; separate=0). Cybersecurity Incident is manipulated as the presence or absence of a reported cybersecurity incident subsequent to the cybersecurity
examination report date (incident=1; no incident=0). Willingness to Invest is the change between the pre- and the post-manipulation measures. A positive change
in Willingness to Invest indicates an increased willingness to invest. Willingness to Invest includes investment attractiveness and investment likelihood.
Participants rate investment attractiveness on a seven-point scale with endpoints “very unattractive” and “very attractive.” Participants rate investment likelihood
on a seven-point scale with endpoints “very unlikely” and “very likely.” Participants rate their confidence in the audit firm’s (1) Independence, (2) Competence,
and (3) Audit Quality on seven-point scales with endpoints “No Confidence” and “Extreme Confidence.”
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Chapter 3. Essay 2: The Impact of the Type of Cybersecurity Assurance Service and
Cybersecurity Incidents on Investor Perceptions and Decisions
2.8 Introduction
As the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) noted recently, “Cybersecurity is
critical to the operations of our markets and the risks are significant” (SEC 2017a, 1).
Cybercrime can result in reputational damage, loss of proprietary information, revenue loss,
government fines, litigation expenses, increased insurance premiums, and incident response and
mitigation expenses (SEC 2018a; CAQ 2016). With the goal of providing more complete and
useful information to investors, the SEC recently issued guidance for public company
cybersecurity disclosures highlighting the importance of information about organizations’
cybersecurity risk management programs and “…the adequacy of preventative actions taken to
reduce cybersecurity risks” (SEC 2018a, 14).
In response to heightened attention to cybersecurity risk, the American Institute of
Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) has released a new examination service designed to
provide external assurance for organizations’ cybersecurity risk management programs (AICPA
2017a, 2018).12 The cybersecurity risk management examination is a voluntary, general-use
report that is intended to benefit a broad range of potential users including investors and other
stakeholders such as customers, analysts, directors, business partners, and regulators (AICPA

12

A cybersecurity risk management program is a “…set of policies, processes, and controls designed to protect
information and systems from security events that could compromise the achievement of the entity’s cybersecurity
objectives and to detect, respond to, mitigate, and recover from, on a timely basis, security events that are not
prevented” (AICPA 2017b, 207).
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2017a).13 The top six audit firms are currently advertising their cybersecurity risk management
examination service offerings and public company boards are increasingly requesting
cybersecurity assurance services (Deloitte 2018a; AAA 2019).
The current voluntary cybersecurity assurance reporting market includes many alternative
third-party assurance services and providers (Kuranda 2017) and disparate assurance programs
and frameworks with no widely accepted standard (AICPA 2017a). For example, cybersecurity
assurance services can differ in terms of the comprehensiveness of the subject matter (AICPA
2017b). A more comprehensive cybersecurity risk management examination includes all
components of a cybersecurity risk management program such as the nature of business
operations and information at risk, cybersecurity objectives, risk assessments, governance
structure, communications, monitoring, and control processes (AICPA 2017b). Each component
further consists of a number of controls that are examined. For example, vulnerability and
penetration tests are included as a single control within the monitoring and risk assessment
component of a cybersecurity risk management program (AICPA 2017b). Yet, vulnerability and
penetration tests are offered by various vendors as a standalone service. Stakeholders may have
difficulty distinguishing between the comprehensiveness of alternative cybersecurity assurance
services and may even perceive a vulnerability and penetration test as equally or perhaps more
valuable than a cybersecurity risk management examination. Moreover, prior research
examining another AICPA IT-related voluntary assurance reporting initiative called WebTrust
that did not gain any significant market acceptance find that information users do not recognize

13

System and Organization Controls (SOC) for Cybersecurity examinations include three components: (1)
management’s description of the cybersecurity risk management program, (2) management’s assertion that the
description is presented in accordance with the description criteria and that the controls within the program were
effective based on the control criteria, and (3) the CPA’s opinion on management’s description and the effectiveness
of the controls within the program (AICPA 2017a).
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the value of the more comprehensive external assurance services relative to less comprehensive
external assurance alternatives (Mauldin and Arunachalam 2002; Gendron and Barrett 2004).
Accordingly, the first objective of this study is to examine the impact of the type of voluntary
external cybersecurity assurance service on investors’ perceptions and decisions.
Cybersecurity incidents are increasingly prevalent and “no company or organization is
immune from cyberattack” (SEC 2018b, 1). The average cost of cybercrime has increased 62
percent over the last five years and cybercrime continues to become more sophisticated
(Accenture 2017). In the context of cybersecurity assurance disclosures, previous cybersecurity
incidents are likely to affect investors’ perceptions of the importance of the type of external
assurance provided and in turn investors’ perceptions and decisions. More specifically, if a
cybersecurity incident precedes the external cybersecurity assurance (i.e., obtaining the
cybersecurity external assurance is in response to a significant cybersecurity incident), investors
may view the cybersecurity assurance service as a post-hoc reactive measure and may therefore
be more sensitive to the type of external assurance service provided. In the presence of a
previous cybersecurity incident, a more comprehensive cybersecurity assurance service might
increase investors’ perceptions of the company’s ability to not only prevent future cybersecurity
incidents, but also to recover from future cybersecurity incidents that are not prevented.14
Therefore, the second objective of this study is to examine the effect of a previous cybersecurity
incident on the relation between the type of cybersecurity assurance service and investors’
perceptions and decisions.

14

SEC Chairman Clayton underscores the importance of both preventive and reactive measures to reduce
cybersecurity risk and states that “we also must recognize…that there will be intrusions, and that a key component
of cyber risk management is resilience and recovery.” (SEC 2017a, 1)
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I draw on dual processing theories (Chaiken 1980; Petty and Cacioppo 1986; Chaiken
and Maheswaran 1994; Kahneman 2003), the management disclosure credibility framework
(Mercer 2004), and the information hypothesis (Wallace 1987) to develop hypotheses regarding
the impact of the type of cybersecurity assurance service on investors’ willingness to invest, the
potential positive moderating effect of a previous cybersecurity incident, and the potential
mediating effect of perceptions of cybersecurity assurance services quality. To test my
hypotheses, I conduct an experiment using a 2 x 2 between-participant design, in which I
manipulate type of cybersecurity assurance service as a more comprehensive cybersecurity risk
management examination or a less comprehensive vulnerability and penetration test and
cybersecurity incident as no incident or incident precedes assurance. I measure the effect of
these manipulations on willingness to invest, perceptions of cybersecurity assurance services
quality, and perceptions of management credibility.
Participants in the study are nonprofessional (i.e., retail) investors because the SEC is
concerned about the “risks to retail investors in today’s marketplace” (SEC 2017b) and
“protecting retail investors is at the heart of the Commission’s mission” (SEC 2018c). The
importance of examining nonprofessional investors’ perceptions of cybersecurity assurance
disclosures is underscored by the SEC’s concern for the grave cybersecurity threats facing the
“investing public” and the need for more robust cybersecurity disclosures (SEC 2018a, 2). In
addition, cybersecurity incidents involving the theft of sensitive customer information are often
highly publicized leading to nonprofessional investors’ heightened awareness of cybersecurity
risk.15 Nonprofessional investors’ awareness of cybersecurity risk is further heightened as their

15

Cybersecurity incidents are increasing in both numbers and economic significance and are required to be
disclosed if material (SEC 2011, 2018a).
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personal information and devices are increasingly digitally connected and susceptible to
cybersecurity threats (e.g., NCSA 2017; SEC 2017c)
I find that investors are more willing to invest when management disclosures describe a
more comprehensive cybersecurity risk management examination rather than a less
comprehensive vulnerability and penetration test. This result is significant both in the absence of
a cybersecurity incident and when a cybersecurity incident precedes cybersecurity assurance. I
also find that investors’ perceptions of cybersecurity assurance services quality mediate the
relation between type of cybersecurity assurance service and willingness to invest. Additional
analyses suggest that a more comprehensive assurance service results in higher perceptions of
cybersecurity assurance services quality because of the perception that the company is more
prepared to recover from future cybersecurity incidents that are not prevented. The results also
show that higher perceptions of cybersecurity assurance services quality have a positive effect on
investor perceptions of management credibility, which in turn has a positive effect on willingness
to invest.
This study makes three contributions to research and practice. First, I contribute to the
growing literature related to cybersecurity disclosures. Using an experimental method, I am able
to examine the effect of the AICPA’s new cybersecurity risk management examination in
comparison to competing external assurance services on investors’ perceptions of cybersecurity
assurance service quality and answer the AICPA’s call for research on how users react to
cybersecurity assurance reporting (AAA 2017a, 2017b). I also shed light on investors’
perceptions of important aspects of cybersecurity risk management assurance in terms of a
company’s ability to not only prevent future cybersecurity incidents, but also to recover from
future cybersecurity incidents that are not prevented.
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Second, I contribute to the voluntary assurance disclosure literature by examining
investor reactions to management disclosures of alternative types of voluntary external
cybersecurity assurance service, beyond a comparison of the absence or presence of external
assurance reports provided by CPAs previously examined in other non-financial voluntary
assurance settings. My results show that the comprehensiveness of the voluntary assurance
service disclosed by management affects users’ judgments and decisions. I also find that
management’s choice to acquire a more comprehensive cybersecurity assurance service has a
positive effect on investors’ perceptions of management credibility, which in turn has a positive
effect on investors’ willingness to invest.
Third, this study makes an important contribution to practice. The new cybersecurity risk
management examination service shares many features with the WebTrust service that did not
gain much traction in the market. For example, both WebTrust and cybersecurity risk
management examinations are designed and promoted by the AICPA as a voluntary assurance
service over IT related controls and face competition from less comprehensive and less costly
assurance service alternatives in a voluntary and non-standardized assurance market. However,
despite the limited success of WebTrust, my results suggest that nonprofessional investors are
sensitive to the type of cybersecurity assurance service provided, and companies can benefit
from investing in more comprehensive cybersecurity risk management assurance services. This
is an important finding given that cybersecurity has become a top concern for public companies
and their boards who are increasingly looking to CPA firms to provide cybersecurity assurance
services (AICPA 2018; Deloitte 2018a; EY 2018; AAA 2019).
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2.9 Theory and Hypotheses Development

3.2.1 External Assurance
Mercer’s (2004) management disclosure credibility framework explains that investors’
perceptions of external assurance, management credibility, and contextual factors together effect
investors’ valuation judgments. Consistent with source credibility theory (Birnbaum and Stegner
1979) and the importance of the credibility of a message’s source, Mercer’s (2004) management
disclosure credibility framework suggests that external assurance supporting a management
disclosure affects investors’ perceptions of disclosure credibility and the extent to which
investors rely on the disclosure for valuation judgments. For example, prior research finds that
users perceive management disclosures with external assurance reports as more credible than
management disclosures without external assurance reports (e.g., Libby 1979; Blackwell,
Noland, and Winters 1998; Hodge 2001).
Based on Mercer’s (2004) management disclosure credibility framework and Wallace’s
(1987) information hypothesis explaining that external assurance reduces information asymmetry
and uncertainty, Coram, Monroe, and Woodliff (2009) find that the presence of an external
assurance report is particularly important if financial statement users perceive management
disclosures of non-financial information to be incentive-consistent (i.e., if the disclosure could be
perceived as self-serving).16 Prior research examining voluntary corporate social responsibility
reporting similarly finds that nonprofessional investors and financial analysts perceive
managements’ incentive-consistent corporate social responsibility disclosures as more credible in
the presence versus absence of external assurance reports (Pflugrath, Roebuck, and Simnett

16

Given the voluntary nature of cybersecurity external assurance disclosures, cybersecurity external assurance
disclosures are unlikely to contain negative news and are likely to be perceived as incentive consistent.
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2011). This research also shows that the presence of external assurance reports has a positive
effect on stock price assessments (Brown-Liburd and Zamora 2014) and willingness to invest
(Cheng, Green, and Ko 2015). However, prior research has not examined the impact of the
AICPA’s new cybersecurity risk management examination service in comparison to alternative
voluntary assurance services available in the current voluntary and non-standardized
cybersecurity assurance market.
Findings from prior literature examining an earlier AICPA IT-related voluntary assurance
reporting initiative called WebTrust provide insights. In 1997, the AICPA launched WebTrust, a
third-party web assurance seal for business-to-consumer e-commerce, as an opportunity to build
on CPA’s expertise in audit and assurance (Elliott 1998; Gendron and Barrett 2004). Although
WebTrust provided a significantly more comprehensive assurance service than alternative thirdparty web assurance seals such as TRUSTe (sponsored by IBM and Microsoft) and BBBOnLine
(sponsored by the Better Business Bureau), WebTrust “failed to generate support in the
marketplace” (Gendron and Barrett 2004, 563). The alternative services were not only less
expensive and easier for management to obtain, but consumers were also not sensitive to the type
of assurance service provided by the different web assurance seals and did not recognize the
value provided by WebTrust in terms of being a more comprehensive assurance services
(Mauldin and Arunachalam 2002; Gendron and Barrett 2004; Bahmanziari, Odom, and Ugrin
2009). Although the WebTrust service “largely failed” (Gendron and Barrett 2004, 594), its
principles and criteria evolved and contributed to the current Trust Services Criteria used for
SOC assurance services (AICPA 2018).
Similar to the voluntary e-commerce assurance market when WebTrust was launched, the
current cybersecurity assurance market includes many alternative third-party assurance services
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and providers (Kuranda 2017) and disparate cybersecurity assurance programs and frameworks
with no widely accepted standard (AICPA 2017a). For example, cybersecurity assurance
services can differ in terms of the comprehensiveness of the subject matter (AICPA 2017b). A
more comprehensive cybersecurity risk management examination includes all components of a
cybersecurity risk management program such as the nature of business operations and
information at risk, cybersecurity objectives, risk assessments, governance structure,
communications, monitoring, and control processes (AICPA 2017b). Each component further
consists of a number of controls that are examined in the AICPA’s cybersecurity risk
management examination. Vulnerability and penetration tests, for example, are included as a
single control within the monitoring and risk assessment component of a cybersecurity risk
management program (AICPA 2017b). However, less comprehensive vulnerability and
penetration tests are offered by various vendors as a standalone service. In the context of
cybersecurity, an investor may have difficulties in distinguishing the comprehensiveness of
alternative services and may even perceive a vulnerability and penetration test as equally or
perhaps more valuable than a cybersecurity risk management examination.
Although many similarities exist between the web assurance context and the
cybersecurity assurance context in terms of alternative types of voluntary assurance services, one
difference between the web assurance context and the cybersecurity assurance context is that
consumers are protected by credit card security guarantees from fraudulent transactions when
making online purchases (Mauldin and Arunachalam 2002; Kim, Steinfield, and Lai 2008).
Consequently, although consumers’ private information is at risk, online consumers may be less
sensitive to the type of assurance service provided relative to nonprofessional investors who are
not protected from stock price declines. Another difference between the web assurance and
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cybersecurity assurance contexts is that nonprofessional investors have a heightened awareness
of cybersecurity risk because cybersecurity incidents involving the theft of sensitive customer
information are often highly publicized and nonprofessional investors’ personal information and
devices are increasingly digitally connected and susceptible to cybersecurity threats (e.g., SEC
2017c; 2018b). Given these distinctions, I expect that investors will differentiate between
alternative cybersecurity assurance services that vary in terms of the comprehensiveness of the
assurance service provided. Drawing again on Mercer’s (2004) management disclosure
credibility framework and Wallace’s (1987) information hypothesis explained above, more
comprehensive external assurance services will increase investors’ valuation judgments (e.g.,
willingness to invest). Accordingly, I present the following hypothesis:
H1: In the absence of a cybersecurity incident, investors are more willing to invest in the
presence of a more compared to less comprehensive cybersecurity assurance service.

3.2.2 Cybersecurity Incidents
Cybersecurity incidents are increasing in both numbers and economic significance and
are required to be disclosed if material (SEC 2011, 2018a). Prior archival research finds a
negative market reaction to reported cybersecurity incidents (e.g., Campbell, Gordon, Loeb, and
Zhou 2003; Goel and Shawky, 2009; Gatzlaff and McCullough, 2010; Hinz, Nofer, Schiereck,
and Trillig 2015). In the context of cybersecurity disclosures, previous cybersecurity incidents
are likely to also affect investors’ perceptions of the importance of the type of external assurance
provided and in turn investors’ willingness to invest. More specifically, if a cybersecurity
incident precedes the external cybersecurity assurance (i.e., obtaining the cybersecurity external
assurance is in response to a significant cybersecurity incident), investors may be more sensitive
to the type of external assurance provided and a more comprehensive assurance service might
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increase investors’ perceptions of the company’s ability to not only prevent but also recover from
future cybersecurity incidents. To support this conjecture, I draw on dual processing theories to
explain how nonprofessional investors process types of external cybersecurity assurance services
disclosures in the presence versus absence of a cybersecurity incident.
Dual processing theories differentiate between simple heuristic processing (i.e.,
peripheral route or system one processing) and effortful systematic processing (i.e., central route
or system two processing) (Chaiken 1980; Petty and Cacioppo 1986; Chaiken and Maheswaran
1994; Kahneman 2003). In heuristic processing, individuals rely on easily accessible cues (e.g.
source credibility) to reduce information processing demands when evaluating new information
(Birnbaum and Stegner 1979; Chaiken 1980; Petty and Cacioppo 1986; Chaiken and
Maheswaran 1994; Kahneman 2003). In systematic processing (i.e., central route or system two
processing) individuals have the motivation and ability to use more effortful processing and are
more likely to actively attend to the content of the information (i.e., message) being processed
(Chaiken 1980; Petty and Cacioppo 1986; Chaiken and Maheswaran 1994; Kahneman 2003).
Contextual variables can influence individuals’ motivation to engage in effortful
systematic processing beyond simple heuristic processing (Chaiken 1980; Petty and Cacioppo
1986; Chaiken and Maheswaran 1994; Kahneman 2003). Consistent with dual processing
theories, prior research in accounting has found that contextual factors can motivate individuals
to engage in effortful systematic processing for example in the context of auditor performance
reviews (Brazel, Agoglia, and Hatfield 2004), performance-based contracts (Farrell, Goh, and
White 2014), and auditing of complex estimates (Griffith 2018).
Applying dual processing theories to the cybersecurity disclosure setting, in the absence
of a cybersecurity incident, nonprofessional investors are more likely to engage in simple
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heuristic processing and rely primarily on easily accessible cues resulting in less sensitivity to the
type of external cybersecurity assurance service. However, a contextual variable such as a
cybersecurity incident can motivate investors to engage in effortful systematic processing
resulting in increased attention to the information about the cybersecurity assurance service
provided, including the details of the comprehensiveness of the cybersecurity assurance
provided. Drawing again on Mercer’s (2004) management disclosure credibility framework and
Wallace’s (1987) information hypothesis, more comprehensive external assurance services
impact investors’ valuation judgments (e.g., willingness to invest). Based on this discussion, I
present the following hypothesis:
H2: The difference between willingness to invest in the presence of more and less
comprehensive cybersecurity assurance services will be greater when a cybersecurity
incident precedes cybersecurity assurance than in the absence of an incident.

3.2.3 Perceptions of Cybersecurity Assurance Services Quality
As discussed earlier, Mercer’s (2004) disclosure credibility framework suggests that
external assurance supporting a management disclosure affects investors’ perceptions of the
credibility of management disclosures and in turn investors’ valuation judgments. Consistent
with Mercer (2004), in order for the type of external cybersecurity assurance service to influence
investors’ willingness to invest, investors must indeed perceive the external assurance service
associated with the management disclosure to be of high assurance quality.
The experimental method provides an opportunity to directly measure investors’
perceptions of cybersecurity assurance services quality and to examine whether this important
intervening variable explains why a particular relation exists. For example, Smith (2012) directly
measures investors’ perceptions of audit quality and finds that this intervening variable mediates
the relation between changes in auditing standards and investors’ investment allocations.
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Gimbar, Hansen, and Ozlanski (2016) also measure perceptions of audit quality and find that
jurors’ perceptions of audit quality mediate the relation between critical audit matters and auditor
liability.
I expect that investors will perceive more comprehensive cybersecurity risk management
examinations to be of higher cybersecurity assurance services quality than less comprehensive
cybersecurity assurance services and that investors’ perceptions of cybersecurity assurance
services quality will mediate the relation between the type of cybersecurity assurance service and
willingness to invest both in the absence and presence of a prior cybersecurity incident.
Accordingly, I present the following mediation hypotheses:
H3a: Perceptions of cybersecurity assurance service quality will mediate the relation
between the type of cybersecurity assurance service and willingness to invest in
the absence of a cybersecurity incident.
H3b: Perceptions of cybersecurity assurance service quality will mediate the relation
between the type of cybersecurity assurance service and willingness to invest when
a cybersecurity incident precedes cybersecurity assurance.
2.10

Research Method

3.3.1 Participants
Participants are 465 nonprofessional investors recruited from Amazon’s Mechanical Turk
platform (MTurk). Rennekamp 2012; Koonce, Miller, and Winchel (2015); Brasel, Doxey,
Grenier and Reffett (2016), and Farrell, Grenier, and Leiby (2017) demonstrate the
appropriateness of using MTurk participants in accounting experiments. I enforced strict
qualification requirements, including a MTurk human intelligence task (HIT) approval rate
greater than 98 percent on at least 5,000 approved HITs, no duplicate IP addresses, and
participants located in the U.S. To incentivize effort and attention I also implement a bonus
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payment structure as recommended by Buchheit, Doxey, Pollard, and Stinson (2018).
I focus on nonprofessional (i.e., retail) investors’ perceptions of cybersecurity assurance
disclosures because the SEC is concerned about the “risks to retail investors in today’s
marketplace” (SEC 2017b) and the grave cybersecurity threats facing the “investing public” and
the need for more robust cybersecurity disclosures (SEC 2018a, 2). The importance of
nonprofessional (i.e., retail) investors’ perceptions is underscored by 44 percent of U.S.
households (56 million households) owning mutual funds (SEC 2018d) and 52 percent of U.S.
households owning stock (Federal Reserve 2017). These nonprofessional investors have a
heightened awareness of cybersecurity risks because many cybersecurity incidents involving the
theft of sensitive customer information are highly publicized (e.g., Equifax, Target, and Yahoo).
Nonprofessional investors also have a heightened awareness of cybersecurity risks because their
personal information and devices are increasingly digitally connected and susceptible to
cybersecurity threats (e.g., NCSA 2017; SEC 2017c).
The participants are on average 37.5 years old with 15.9 years of work experience and
56.4 percent are male.17 On average, the participants have taken 2.0 accounting and finance
courses and have purchased or sold individual stocks or mutual funds 17.3 times. Thus, the
participants are an appropriate proxy for nonprofessional investors. Further, 91.2 (97.8) percent
of participants report having have made in-store (online) department store purchases in the last
three months and 33.1 percent of participants report having been a victim of identity theft or
credit card fraud. On average, participants spent 6.34 minutes completing the experiment
corresponding to a compensation of $9.26 per hour. In support of random assignment of
participants to experimental conditions, multiple comparisons with Tukey HSD do not indicate

17

Institutional Review Board approval was obtained prior to recruiting participants and collecting data.

54

any significant between-group differences in terms of investment experience, accounting and
finance courses, work experience, age, gender, time spent on the task, identity theft or credit card
fraud, in-store purchases, and online purchases.18

3.3.2 Experimental Task and Design
The experiment employs a 2 x 2 between-participant design and manipulates type of
cybersecurity assurance service as a more comprehensive cybersecurity risk management
examination or a less comprehensive vulnerability and penetration test and cybersecurity
incident as no incident or incident precedes assurance. The experiment is administered online
through Qualtrics software. In step one, participants are informed of recent cybersecurity
guidance from U.S. regulators including the SEC’s (2018a) guidance for public company
cybersecurity disclosures and the new National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)
Cybersecurity Framework developed under U.S. Executive Order 13636 and formalized by the
U.S. Cybersecurity Enhancement Act of 2014 (NIST 2018). I provide this regulatory
information to participants because although it is in the process of being widely publicized to
nonprofessional investors in the popular press (e.g., Javers 2018; McKenna 2018; Pisani 2018;
Schroeder and Finkle 2018; Shumsky 2018; Skroupa 2018; Stone 2018; Woods 2018) it is
relatively new at the time of conducting the experiment.
Participants are then provided background information about a fictitious company, Cost
Saver. The background information includes financial performance ratios and statistics for the
company as well as corresponding industry averages. Participants are also provided information

18

Given that I did not detect significant between-group differences, the results reported are based on analyses
without control variables. The results are qualitatively similar when the control variables are included in the models.
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about the company’s e-commerce strategy. Comprehension check questions are used to assess
whether participants attend to and understand the background information.
In step two of the experiment, participants are presented with management disclosures
that describe the nature and timing of a cybersecurity incident and that Cost Saver obtained a
cybersecurity assurance service from an independent third party. Participants are randomly
presented one of the four experimental conditions: (1) more comprehensive cybersecurity risk
management examination and no cybersecurity incident, (2) less comprehensive vulnerability
and penetration test and no cybersecurity incident (3) more comprehensive cybersecurity risk
management examination and cybersecurity incident precedes assurance, and (4) less
comprehensive vulnerability and penetration test and cybersecurity incident precedes assurance.
Participants in the cybersecurity incident precedes assurance conditions are presented a
management disclosure explaining that management has detected a cybersecurity incident
compromising sensitive customer data and has obtained cybersecurity assurance services in
response to the cybersecurity incident. Participants in the no cybersecurity incident conditions
are not informed of a cybersecurity incident.
Participants in the more comprehensive conditions are provided a management disclosure
explaining that management has engaged one of the world’s leading audit, tax, and advisory
professional services firms to conduct a cybersecurity risk management program examination.
The description of the high assurance service is adapted from an illustrative cybersecurity risk
management examination report provided by the AICPA (AICPA 2017b). Comprehensive
cybersecurity risk management examinations include all components of a cybersecurity risk
management program such as the nature of business operations and information at risk,
cybersecurity risk management program objectives, risk assessments, governance structure,
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communications, monitoring, and control processes (AICPA 2017b). Alternatively, participants
in the less comprehensive vulnerability and penetration test conditions are provided a
management disclosure explaining that management engaged one of the world’s leading audit,
tax, and advisory professional services firms to conduct an automated vulnerability and
penetration test. Less comprehensive vulnerability and penetration tests include only one control
within a cybersecurity risk management program (AICPA 2017b). Although vulnerability and
penetration tests are offered by many alternative providers (Kuranda 2017), the description of the
less comprehensive cybersecurity assurance service is adapted from a cybersecurity risk service
currently offered by one of the big four audit, tax, and advisory professional services firms (e.g.,
Deloitte 2018b). The adaptation of the service used in the experiment focuses on aspects of the
service that reflect a less comprehensive assurance service. In addition, examples of recent
cybersecurity disclosures made by a leading provider of credit services in the U.S. (Equifax
2017) and a leading provider of health benefits in the U.S. (Anthem 2015) also contribute to the
wording of the cybersecurity disclosures used in the experiment.
Participants are then asked to provide their willingness to invest. Next, participants
provide their perceptions of cybersecurity assurance services quality and perceptions of
management credibility. Finally, participants answer manipulation check and demographic
questions.

3.3.3 Dependent Variable
Willingness to Invest. Drawing on prior research (e.g., Elliott, Rennekamp, and White
2015; Tang and Venkataraman 2018), I measure investors’ willingness to invest based on the
average of investment attractiveness and investment likelihood. To measure investment
attractiveness, I ask participants how attractive an investment in Cost Saver is on a 7-point Likert
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scale anchored on 1 (very unattractive) and 7 (very attractive). To measure investment
likelihood, participants are asked to assume that they are given $10,000 to invest in the
department store retail industry and to indicate the likelihood that they will invest in Cost Saver
relative to its peers in the department store retail industry on a 7-point Likert scale anchored on 1
(more likely to invest in peers) and 7 (more likely to invest in Cost Saver).

3.3.4 Other Measured Variables
Perceptions of Cybersecurity Assurance Services Quality. As noted by the SEC,
“Cybersecurity efforts must include, in addition to assessment, prevention and mitigation,
resilience and recovery” (SEC 2017d, 1). SEC Chairman Clayton further states “we also must
recognize…that there will be intrusions, and that a key component of cyber risk management is
resilience and recovery” (SEC 2017a, 1). Given the importance of both prevention and recovery
in cybersecurity risk management, I measure investors’ perceptions of cybersecurity assurance
services quality by asking participants to rate the quality of the cybersecurity assurance service
(cybersecurity risk management examination or vulnerability and penetration test) in assessing
Cost Saver's ability to (a) prevent future cybersecurity incidents and (b) recover from future
cybersecurity incidents that are not prevented. I measure responses on 7-point Likert scales
anchored on 1 (very low quality) and 7 (very high quality). I combine the two measures for
hypothesis testing and examine the individual measures in additional analyses.
Perceptions of Management Credibility. Mercer’s (2004) disclosure credibility
framework suggests that investors’ perceptions of management credibility, external assurance,
and contextual factors together effect investors’ valuation judgments. Although I do not
manipulate management credibility directly in this study, it is possible that management’s choice
to acquire a more comprehensive external assurance service will influence investors’ perceptions
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of management credibility (Pflugrath et al. 2011), consistent with source credibility theory
(Birnbaum and Stegner 1979) and the importance of the credibility of a message’s source. That
is, management’s choice to acquire a more comprehensive cybersecurity assurance service may
signal to investors that management is confident in the organization’s cybersecurity risk
management program and that management believes that cybersecurity risk management is
important to the overall business strategy thereby increasing investors’ perceptions of
management credibility. If this signal indeed leads to higher perceptions of management
credibility, higher perceptions of management credibility will impact investors’ valuation
judgments (Mercer 2004).
Given the uncertainty of how investors will interpret management’s choice to acquire a
more comprehensive cybersecurity assurance service, I measure perceptions of management
credibility for additional analyses. Specifically, I measure perceptions of the competence of
management related to actions taken to manage and reduce cybersecurity risk on a 7-point Likert
scale, anchored on 1 (very incompetent) and 7 (very competent) and perceptions of
trustworthiness of management related to actions taken to manage and reduce cybersecurity risk
on a 7-point Likert scale, anchored on 1 (very untrustworthy) and 7 (very trustworthy).
Consistent with prior research (e.g., Koonce and Lipe 2010; Rennekamp 2012), I combine these
two measures into a single measure of perceptions of management credibility. I then investigate
whether perceptions of management credibility mediate the relation between perceptions of
cybersecurity assurance services quality and willingness to invest.
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2.11

Results

3.4.1 Manipulation Checks
In order to incentivize effort and attention and following the recommendation in Buchheit
et al. (2018), participants are informed that they would be compensated for satisfactory
participation as well as an extra bonus if they answer all comprehension and manipulation check
questions correctly. Out of a total of 465 complete responses, 320 participants answer both
manipulation check questions correctly. The results reported in the paper are based on analyses
that include all participants, but results are qualitatively similar when participants failing one or
more manipulation check questions are excluded from the analyses.

3.4.2 Descriptive Statistics
Table 3.1 provides descriptive statistics. When no incident is reported, the mean (std
dev.) willingness to invest in the more comprehensive assurance condition is 5.55 (0.91)
compared to 5.27 (0.95) in the less comprehensive assurance condition. These means appear to
provide support for H1 that predicts that when no cybersecurity incident is reported, investors are
more willing to invest in the presence of more compared to less comprehensive cybersecurity
assurance services. When an incident is reported, the mean (std dev.) willingness to invest in the
more comprehensive condition is 4.57 (1.30) compared to 4.09 (1.37) in the less comprehensive
condition. This difference, i.e., 0.48, appears to be larger than the difference in the no incident
condition, i.e., 0.28, which provides preliminary support for H2. The descriptive statistics also
indicate that perceptions of cybersecurity assurance services quality are higher in the more
comprehensive conditions (mean=5.48 and 5.16, S.D.=0.87 and 0.89) than in the less
comprehensive conditions (mean=4.78 and 4.46, S.D.=1.11 and 1.12). These results provide
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initial support for H3a and H3b, which state that the relation between the type of cybersecurity
assurance service and willingness to invest will be mediated by perceptions of cybersecurity
assurance services quality both in the absence and presence of a prior cybersecurity incident.

3.4.3 Tests of Hypotheses
Table 3.2 shows the results from analysis of variance (ANOVA) that is used to test H1
and H2. In support of H1, the planned comparison reported in Table 3.2 Panel B shows a
significantly higher mean willingness to invest in the more comprehensive condition compared
to the less comprehensive condition when no cybersecurity incident is reported (p=0.033). Table
3.2 Panel B also shows significantly higher mean willingness to invest in the more
comprehensive condition compared to the less comprehensive condition when a cybersecurity
incident is reported (p=0.002). These results suggest that a more comprehensive cybersecurity
assurance service results in a greater willingness to invest both when there is and when there is
not a cybersecurity incident reported prior to the assurance service.
As noted earlier and predicted in H2, the mean willingness to invest differences between
the more and less comprehensive conditions reported in Table 3.2 Panel B appear to be higher
when an incident is present (0.48) than when it is absent (0.28). However, as reported in Table
3.2 Panel A, the interaction effect is insignificant (p=0.167) and H2 is not supported. This
unexpected result may be due to nonprofessional investors’ already heightened awareness of
cybersecurity risk even in the absence of a prior incident. Highly publicized incidents such as
Equifax, Target, and Yahoo, are increasingly prevalent (SEC 2018b). Nonprofessional
investors’ expectations are perhaps similar to regulators with respect to no organization “is
immune from cyberattack” (SEC 2018b, 1) and “…there will be intrusions” (SEC 2017a, 1).
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H3a and H3b predict that perceptions of cybersecurity assurance services quality will
mediate the relation between the type of cybersecurity assurance service and willingness to
invest both in the absence of a cybersecurity incident and when a cybersecurity incident precedes
assurance. Given the insignificant interaction effect and for ease of exposition, I exclude the
interaction effect in the primary test of H3 mediation analyses and thereby do not test H3a and
H3b separately. For completeness, after reporting these results I also provide the results from an
analysis of conditional indirect effects of type of cybersecurity assurance service on willingness
to invest when the mediation analysis includes the interaction effect, which allows for
independent tests of H3a and H3b. All mediation analyses are performed using PROCESS
(Hayes 2018).
Figure 3.1 and Table 3.3 Panel A show mediation analysis results from a model that
includes the two manipulated variables as independent variables, perceptions of cybersecurity
assurance services quality as a mediating variable, and willingness to invest as the dependent
variable. The results in Figure 3.1 appear to support H3 overall by indicating significant and
positive relations between the type of assurance and perceptions of cybersecurity assurance
services quality (p<0.001) and between perceptions of cybersecurity assurance services quality
and willingness to invest (p<0.001). The results in Table 3.3 Panel A provide more formal
support for H3 overall by testing the indirect effect (the mediation effect). More specifically,
based on a 95 percent confidence level and 5,000 bootstrap samples (used for all confidence
intervals reported), the confidence interval for the indirect effect of the type of assurance on
willingness to invest through perceptions of cybersecurity assurance services quality (effect
size=0.21) is entirely above zero (0.09 to 0.34). Thus, as predicted by H3 overall, the relation
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between type of assurance and willingness to invest is mediated by perceptions of cybersecurity
assurance services quality.
An analysis of conditional indirect effects provides more specific support for both H3a
and H3b. The conditional indirect effects are based on a model with the type of assurance as the
independent variable, cybersecurity incident as a moderating variable, perceptions of
cybersecurity assurance services quality as a mediator, and willingness to invest as the dependent
variable. The results in Table 3.4 show significant conditional indirect effects for the type to
quality to willingness path both when a cybersecurity incident is absent (confidence interval from
0.06 to 0.37) and when a cybersecurity incident is present (confidence interval from 0.01 to
0.41). Further, as expected given the insignificant interaction effect in the ANOVA model, the
difference between the two indirect effects is not significant (confidence interval from -0.25 to
0.24).

3.4.4 Additional Analyses
Perceptions of Management Credibility Mediation Analysis. To examine whether
perceptions of management credibility mediate the relation between perceptions of cybersecurity
assurance services quality and willingness to invest, I examine a serial mediation model with
perceptions of cybersecurity assurance services quality and perceptions of management
credibility as the mediators between type of assurance and willingness to invest. Figure 3.2
presents the results for the individual paths in this mediation model and Table 3.3 Panel B
provides the results for the indirect effects.
The path coefficients in Figure 3.2 are similar to those reported in Figure 3.1 except for
the direct effect of perceptions of cybersecurity assurance services quality on willingness to
invest, which is 0.66 (p<0.001) in Figure 3.1 and 0.18 (p=0.004) in Figure 3.2. The apparent
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decrease in this direct effect is due to the addition of perceptions of management credibility as a
mediating variable between perceptions of cybersecurity assurance services quality and
willingness to invest. Further, the path between perceptions of cybersecurity assurance services
quality and perceptions of management credibility is positive and significant (coef=0.87;
p<0.001). The subsequent path between perceptions of management credibility and willingness
to invest is also positive and significant (coef=0.57; p<0.001). These two positive effects
suggest that perceptions of management credibility acts as a significant mediator between
perceptions of cybersecurity assurance services quality and willingness to invest. More formal
support for this conjecture is provided by the significant results for the type to quality to
credibility to willingness path indirect effect reported in Table 3.3 Panel B. More specifically,
the confidence interval for this indirect effect (effect size=0.16) is entirely above zero (0.06 to
0.26).
Prevention versus Recovery Mediation Analysis. Given the importance of both
prevention and recovery in cybersecurity risk management, I perform a mediation analyses that
replaces the perceptions of cybersecurity assurance services quality mediating variable in Figure
3.1 with two parallel mediators representing the two dimensions of cybersecurity assurance
services quality (see Figure 3.3). The two dimensions measure perceptions of the quality of the
cybersecurity assurance service in assessing Cost Saver's ability to (a) prevent future
cybersecurity incidents and (b) recover from future cybersecurity incidents that are not
prevented.
Figure 3.3 and Table 3.3 Panel C present the parallel mediation model results. Figure 3.3
shows that the type of assurance has a positive and significant effect on recover (coef=0.54;
p<0.001) and an insignificant effect on prevent (coef=0.10; p=0.329). Table 3.3 Panel C
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showing results for the indirect effects with recover and prevent as the mediators between type
of assurance and willingness to invest provide similar results. The type to recover to willingness
path indirect effect is significant (confidence interval from 0.08 to 0.25), but the type to prevent
to willingness path indirect effect is not significant (confidence interval from -0.04 to 0.12).
Additionally, a comparison of the two indirect effects indicates that the recover indirect effect is
significantly more positive than the prevent indirect effect (confidence interval from 0.01 to
0.22). These results suggest that the more comprehensive conditions result in higher perceptions
of cybersecurity assurance services quality primarily because of the perception that the company
is more prepared to recover from future cybersecurity incidents that are not prevented.
2.12

Conclusion
In response to increasing cybersecurity risks, the AICPA recently released a

cybersecurity risk management examination service designed to provide assurance about
organizations’ cybersecurity risk management programs (AICPA 2017a). Considering the
voluntary and non-standardized nature of the current cybersecurity risk management assurance
services market (AICPA 2017a; Kuranda 2017) and the limited success of a previous AICPA ITrelated voluntary assurance reporting initiative called WebTrust (Mauldin and Arunachalam
2002; Gendron and Barrett 2004), it is important to understand how the new comprehensive
AICPA cybersecurity service would be perceived by stakeholders. I conduct an experiment to
investigate how nonprofessional investors perceive and react to management disclosures related
to alternative types of external cybersecurity assurance. I focus specifically on nonprofessional
investors because the SEC is concerned about the grave cybersecurity threats facing the investing
public and the need for more robust cybersecurity disclosures (SEC 2017b, 2018a).
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I find that investors are more willing to invest when management disclosures describe a
more compared to less comprehensive type of cybersecurity assurance service. This result is
significant both in the absence of a reported cybersecurity incident and when a cybersecurity
incident precedes cybersecurity assurance. I also find that investors’ perceptions of
cybersecurity assurance services quality mediate the relation between type of cybersecurity
assurance service and willingness to invest. Additional analyses suggest that a more
comprehensive assurance service results in higher perceptions of cybersecurity assurance
services quality because of the perception that the company is more prepared to recover from
future cybersecurity incidents that are not prevented. The results also show that management’s
choice to acquire a more comprehensive external cybersecurity assurance service has a positive
effect on investor perceptions of management credibility, which in turn has a positive effect on
willingness to invest.
This study makes three contributions to research and practice. First, this study
contributes to the growing literature related to cybersecurity assurance disclosures. Using an
experimental method, I am able to examine effects of the AICPA’s new cybersecurity risk
management examination service in comparison to competing external assurance services and
answer the AICPA’s call for research on how users react to cybersecurity assurance reporting
(AAA 2017a, 2017b). I also shed light on investors’ perceptions of vital aspects of cybersecurity
risk management assurance in terms of an organization’s ability to not only prevent future
cybersecurity incidents, but also to recover from future incidents that are not prevented – an
important finding as cybersecurity incidents are inevitable and a key component of cybersecurity
risk management is recovery (SEC 2017a, 2017d).
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Second, I contribute to the voluntary assurance disclosure literature by examining
investors’ reactions to managements’ disclosures of alternative types of voluntary external
cybersecurity assurance service and show that the comprehensiveness of the voluntary assurance
service voluntarily disclosed by management affects users’ judgments and decisions. I also find
that management’s choice to acquire a more comprehensive cybersecurity assurance service has
a positive effect on investor perceptions of management credibility, which in turn has a positive
effect on willingness to invest. Management’s choice may signal to investors that management
is confident in the organization’s cybersecurity risk management program and that management
believes that cybersecurity risk management is important to the overall business strategy.
Third, this study makes an important contribution to practice. The new cybersecurity risk
management examination service shares many features with the AICPA’s previous WebTrust
service that did not fare well in the marketplace. Yet, providing preliminary evidence that the
AICPA’s new SOC for Cybersecurity service may garner greater market acceptability, my
results suggest that nonprofessional investors are sensitive to the type of cybersecurity assurance
service provided, and companies can benefit from investing in more comprehensive
cybersecurity risk management assurance services such as the AICPA’s SOC for Cybersecurity.
This is an important finding given that cybersecurity has become a top concern for public
companies and their boards who are looking to CPA firms to increasingly report on cybersecurity
program effectiveness (AICPA 2018; Deloitte 2018a; EY 2018; AAA 2019).
These findings should be interpreted in light of certain limitations that can also provide
future research opportunities. First, although the new cybersecurity guidance from regulators
(SEC 2018a; NIST 2018) is in the process of being widely publicized to nonprofessional
investors in the popular press, it is possible that the observed results will not generalize to less
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informed investors. Future studies could also examine whether professional investors react
differently than nonprofessional investors to alternative voluntary cybersecurity assurance
service disclosures. Second, the retail industry is held constant to control for industry effects and
to make the setting more salient to nonprofessional investors. However, future research could
examine whether alternative cybersecurity assurance services affect investors’ perceptions and
decisions differently by industry. Third, to explore potential differences between the AICPA’s
new cybersecurity risk management examination service and competing assurance services the
service provider is held constant in the manipulations. By instead holding the cybersecurity
assurance service constant, future research could examine the effects of the service provider on
investor perceptions and decisions. Such research could also be designed to examine investors’
perceptions of CPAs’ expertise in the context of cybersecurity assurance services.
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2.13

Tables for Essay 2

Table 3.1: Essay 2 Descriptive Statistics – Mean (Standard Deviations)
Type of Cybersecurity Assurance Service

More Comprehensive
Willingness to Invest
Cybersecurity Assurance Services Quality
Less Comprehensive
Willingness to Invest
Cybersecurity Assurance Services Quality
Column Means
Willingness to Invest
Cybersecurity Assurance Services Quality

Cybersecurity Incident
No Incident

Incident Precedes
Assurance

Row Means

5.55 (0.91)
5.48 (0.87)
n = 118

4.57 (1.30)
4.78 (1.11)
n = 117

5.06 (1.22)
5.13 (1.06)
n = 235

5.27 (0.95)
5.16 (0.89)
n = 117

4.09 (1.37)
4.46 (1.12)
n = 113

4.69 (1.32)
4.82 (1.07)
n = 230

4.34 (1.36)
4.62 (1.13)
n = 230

Grand Means
4.88 (1.28)
4.98 (1.07)
n = 465

5.41 (0.94)
5.32 (0.9)
n = 235

Notes: Willingness to Invest includes investment attractiveness and investment likelihood. Participants rate
investment attractiveness and investment likelihood on a seven-point scales with endpoints “very unattractive” and
“very attractive” and endpoints “very likely to invest in peers” and “very likely to invest in Cost Saver” respectively.
Perceptions of Cybersecurity Assurance Services Quality includes perceptions of prevent and recover. Participants
rate the quality of the assurance service in assessing Cost Saver's ability to (a) prevent future cybersecurity incidents
and (b) recover from future cybersecurity incidents that are not prevented on seven-point scales with endpoints
“very low quality” and “very high quality.”
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Table 3.2: The Effect of Type of Cybersecurity Assurance Service and Cybersecurity
Incident on Willingness to Invest
Panel A: Conventional ANOVA
Source

df

MS

F-value

p-value

16.848
135.959
1.243

12.708
102.549
0.937

< 0.001
< 0.001
0.167

F-value

p-value

3.408
10.163

0.033
0.002

Type of Cybersecurity Assurance Service
Cybersecurity Incident
Assurance X Incident (H2)
Error

1
1
1
461

Panel B: Planned Comparison
Relation

Mean Difference

More > Less Comprehensive for No Incident (H1)
More > Less Comprehensive for Incident

0.277
0.484

Notes: P-values are reported one-tailed when the path coefficient is in the expected direction, otherwise two-tailed.
Cybersecurity Incident is manipulated as no cybersecurity incident or cybersecurity incident precedes cybersecurity
assurance. Type of Cybersecurity Assurance Service is manipulated as more or less comprehensive. Willingness to
Invest includes investment attractiveness and investment likelihood. Participants rate investment attractiveness and
investment likelihood on a seven-point scales with endpoints “very unattractive” and “very attractive” and endpoints
“very likely to invest in peers” and “very likely to invest in Cost Saver” respectively.
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Table 3.3: Indirect Effects of Type of Cybersecurity Assurance Service on Willingness to
Invest
Panel A: Cybersecurity Assurance Services Quality Mediation
Pathsa

Effect

Type  Quality  Willingness

0.21

Standard Confidence Interval Limits
Errorb
Lowerb
Upperb
0.06

0.09

0.34

Panel B: Perceptions of Management Credibility Mediation
Pathsa

Effect
0.21
0.06
-0.01
0.16

Total
Type  Quality  Willingness
Type  Credibility  Willingness
Type  Quality  Credibility  Willingness

Standard Confidence Interval Limits
Errorb
Lowerb
Upperb
0.07
0.03
0.04
0.05

0.06
0.01
-0.08
0.06

0.35
0.12
0.07
0.26

Panel C: Prevent versus Recover Mediation
Pathsa

Effect

Total
Type  Prevent  Willingness
Type  Recover  Willingness
Indirect effect contrast

0.20
0.04
0.16
0.12

a

Standard Confidence Interval Limits
Errorb
Lowerb
Upperb
0.07
0.04
0.04
0.05

0.07
-0.04
0.08
0.01

0.33
0.12
0.25
0.22

Type of Cybersecurity Assurance Service is manipulated as more or less comprehensive. Willingness to Invest
includes investment attractiveness and investment likelihood. Participants rate investment attractiveness and
investment likelihood on a seven-point scales with endpoints “very unattractive” and “very attractive” and
endpoints “very likely to invest in peers” and “very likely to invest in Cost Saver” respectively. Perceptions of
Cybersecurity Assurance Services Quality includes perceptions of prevent and recover. Participants rate the
quality of the assurance service in assessing Cost Saver's ability to (a) prevent future cybersecurity incidents and
(b) recover from future cybersecurity incidents that are not prevented on seven-point scales with endpoints “very
low quality” and “very high quality.” Perceptions of Management Credibility includes perceptions of
management competence and trustworthiness. Participants rate management competence and trustworthiness on a
seven-point scales with endpoints “very incompetent” and “very competent” and endpoints “very untrustworthy”
and “very trustworthy” respectively.
b
All mediation analyses are performed using PROCESS (Hayes 2018) with 5,000 bootstrap samples and 95%
level of confidence.
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Table 3.4: Conditional Indirect Effects of Type of Assurance on Willingness to Invest
Conditiona

Pathsb

Effect Standard Confidence Interval Limits
Errorc
Lowerc
Upperc

Incident = 0

Type  Quality  Willingness

0.21

0.08

0.06

0.37

Incident = 1

Type  Quality  Willingness
Indirect effect contrast

0.21
0.00

0.10
0.12

0.01
-0.25

0.41
0.24

a

Cybersecurity Incident is manipulated as no cybersecurity incident or cybersecurity incident precedes
cybersecurity assurance. Type of Cybersecurity Assurance Service is manipulated as more or less comprehensive.
Willingness to Invest includes investment attractiveness and investment likelihood. Participants rate investment
attractiveness and investment likelihood on a seven-point scales with endpoints “very unattractive” and “very
attractive” and endpoints “very likely to invest in peers” and “very likely to invest in Cost Saver” respectively.
Perceptions of Cybersecurity Assurance Services Quality includes perceptions of prevent and recover.
Participants rate the quality of the assurance service in assessing Cost Saver's ability to (a) prevent future
cybersecurity incidents and (b) recover from future cybersecurity incidents that are not prevented on seven-point
scales with endpoints “very low quality” and “very high quality.”
b
All mediation analyses are performed using PROCESS (Hayes 2018) with 5,000 bootstrap samples and 95%
level of confidence.
c
Indirect effects are tested when a cybersecurity incident is absent (Incident = 0) and when a cybersecurity
incident precedes cybersecurity assurance (Incident = 1).

72

2.14

Figures for Essay 2

Figure 3.1: Perceptions of Cybersecurity Assurance Services Quality Mediation Analysis
Notes: Path coefficients and p-values are obtained using PROCESS (Hayes 2018) with 5,000 bootstrap samples and
95% level of confidence.
Cybersecurity Incident is manipulated as no cybersecurity incident or cybersecurity incident precedes cybersecurity
assurance. Type of cybersecurity assurance service is manipulated as more or less comprehensive. Willingness to
Invest includes investment attractiveness and investment likelihood. Participants rate investment attractiveness and
investment likelihood on a seven-point scales with endpoints “very unattractive” and “very attractive” and endpoints
“very likely to invest in peers” and “very likely to invest in Cost Saver” respectively. Perceptions of Cybersecurity
Assurance Services Quality includes perceptions of prevent and recover. Participants rate the quality of the
assurance service in assessing Cost Saver's ability to (a) prevent future cybersecurity incidents and (b) recover from
future cybersecurity incidents that are not prevented on seven-point scales with endpoints “very low quality” and
“very high quality.”
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Figure 3.2: Perceptions of Management Credibility Mediation Analysis
Notes: Path coefficients and p-values are obtained using PROCESS (Hayes 2018) with 5,000 bootstrap samples and
95% level of confidence.
Cybersecurity Incident is manipulated as no cybersecurity incident or cybersecurity incident precedes cybersecurity
assurance. Type of cybersecurity assurance service is manipulated as more or less comprehensive. Willingness to
Invest includes investment attractiveness and investment likelihood. Participants rate investment attractiveness and
investment likelihood on a seven-point scales with endpoints “very unattractive” and “very attractive” and endpoints
“very likely to invest in peers” and “very likely to invest in Cost Saver” respectively. Perceptions of Cybersecurity
Assurance Services Quality includes perceptions of prevent and recover. Participants rate the quality of the
assurance service in assessing Cost Saver's ability to (a) prevent future cybersecurity incidents and (b) recover from
future cybersecurity incidents that are not prevented on seven-point scales with endpoints “very low quality” and
“very high quality.” Perceptions of Management Credibility includes perceptions of management competence and
trustworthiness. Participants rate management competence and trustworthiness on a seven-point scales with
endpoints “very incompetent” and “very competent” and endpoints “very untrustworthy” and “very trustworthy”
respectively.
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Figure 3.3: Perceptions of Cybersecurity Assurance Services Quality: Prevent versus
Recover Mediation Analysis
Notes: Path coefficients and p-values are obtained using PROCESS (Hayes 2018) with 5,000 bootstrap samples and
95% level of confidence.
Cybersecurity Incident is manipulated as no cybersecurity incident or cybersecurity incident precedes cybersecurity
assurance. Type of cybersecurity assurance service is manipulated as more or less comprehensive. Willingness to
Invest includes investment attractiveness and investment likelihood. Participants rate investment attractiveness and
investment likelihood on a seven-point scales with endpoints “very unattractive” and “very attractive” and endpoints
“very likely to invest in peers” and “very likely to invest in Cost Saver” respectively. Perceptions of Cybersecurity
Assurance Services Quality includes perceptions of prevent and recover. Participants rate the quality of the
assurance service in assessing Cost Saver's ability to (a) prevent future cybersecurity incidents and (b) recover from
future cybersecurity incidents that are not prevented on seven-point scales with endpoints “very low quality” and
“very high quality.”
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Chapter 4. Dissertation Conclusion
The first essay, The Impact of Cybersecurity Risk Management Examinations and
Cybersecurity Incidents on Investor Perceptions and Decisions, examines the effect of voluntary
disclosures of joint or separate provisioning of cybersecurity risk management examinations on
investor perceptions and decisions, and whether these effects differ when a subsequent
cybersecurity incident occurs. Interestingly, I find that the negative signal of a subsequent
cybersecurity incident reverses investors’ positive perceptions of auditor competence and
increases investors’ sensitivity to potential independence impairments when the cybersecurity
risk management examination is jointly provisioned, leading to lower perceptions of audit
quality. I also find that investors are less willing to invest when the cybersecurity risk
management examination is jointly compared to separately provisioned. My results provide
important insights to regulators and standard setters who have raised concerns regarding the
importance of addressing cybersecurity risk in the integrated internal control over financial
reporting and financial statements audits and the potential for independence impairments from
increased auditor performed non-audit services such as the cybersecurity examination service.
My study also contributes to the non-audit services literature not only by examining a unique and
emerging non-audit service not previously examined, but also by showing that non-audit services
are perceived differently depending on whether a negative signal of non-audit service quality is
present.
Essay 2, The Impact of the Type of Cybersecurity Assurance Service and Cybersecurity
Incidents on Investor Perceptions and Decisions examines the effect of the type of cybersecurity
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assurance service on investor perceptions and decisions and whether these effects differ when a
prior cybersecurity incident is reported. I find that investors are more willing to invest and have
higher perceptions of management credibility when voluntary disclosures include a cybersecurity
risk management examination compared to a less comprehensive cybersecurity assurance
service. These findings are important because public company boards are increasingly looking
to audit firms to provide cybersecurity assurance services. I also find that investors perceive
cybersecurity risk management examinations to provide higher assurance quality regarding an
organization’s ability not only to prevent future cybersecurity incidents, but also to recover from
those that are not prevented - a key risk management issue raised by regulators. My study also
contributes to the voluntary assurance disclosure literature by examining investor reactions to
management disclosures of alternative types of voluntary external cybersecurity assurance
service, beyond a comparison of the absence or presence of external assurance reports provided
by CPAs previously examined in other non-financial voluntary assurance settings. I also find
that management’s choice to acquire a more comprehensive cybersecurity assurance service has
a positive effect on investors’ perceptions of management credibility, which in turn has a
positive effect on investors’ willingness to invest.
Both essays contribute to the growing literature related to cybersecurity risks. Most of
this work has been archival in nature and as such, has not been able to examine the effects of the
AICPA’s recently adopted cybersecurity risk management examination reporting. Using an
experimental method, I am able to examine important implications of voluntary cybersecurity
risk management examination reporting and present several opportunities for future research.
First, future research could examine whether professional investors react differently than
nonprofessional investors to cybersecurity risk management examination and cybersecurity
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incident disclosures. Second, I hold the retail industry constant in both essays to control for
industry effects and make the setting more salient to the participants. Future research could
examine whether cybersecurity risk management examination and cybersecurity incident
disclosures impact investors’ perceptions and decisions differently by industry. Third, the
cybersecurity assurance service providers examined in both essays are the large audit firms.
Future research could examine investor perceptions of CPAs’ expertise in the context of
cybersecurity risk management examinations. Fourth, future research could examine variables in
addition to perceptions of competence, independence, and audit quality that provide additional
insights into investors’ judgment and decision making in the context of joint provisioning of
cybersecurity non-audit services. Fifth, although archival data on the level of fees associated
with cybersecurity risk management examination non-audit services are not yet available, the
experimental method could be used in future research to examine the impact of the level of
cybersecurity examination fees on investor perceptions and decisions. Finally, future research
could examine the impact of alternative cybersecurity incidents, i.e., type of incident, type of
information or other asset compromised, length, timing, and severity of the security event, etc.,
on investor perceptions and decisions in the context of voluntary cybersecurity risk management
examination disclosures.
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Appendix A: Experimental Instrument for Essay 1
Instructions: Please assume the role of a potential investor and carefully consider all the information in the following case before
answering the questions that follow.

Background and Initial Valuation
Background
Cost Saver Corporation operates a national chain of discount department stores. Cost Saver has over 11,800 stores nationwide
and grew rapidly in the late 1990s and early 2000s by adding additional stores. Similar to many other retailers, Cost Saver is making
significant investments in ecommerce and in 2017 online sales accounted for 16.4% of total sales. To drive a greater proportion of
their sales through their ecommerce website, Cost Saver provides promotions and makes it easy for in-store customers to create
online user profiles by automatically (after consent from the customer) storing their personal and payment information.
Cost Saver Stock Information
Cost Saver released its 2017 fiscal year financial statements on February 15, 2018. Cost Saver’s 2017 sales increased by 6.5
percent compared to analyst expectations of 6.1 percent and earnings increased by 8.1 percent compared to analyst expectations of
6.3 percent. Analysts increased the stock price target from $56 the day before the results were released to $70 the day after the
results were released. Cost Saver’s stock closing price was $50 the day before the financial statement were released.
Audit Engagement
Big 4 Firm A has been Cost Saver’s auditor for the past six years. Big 4 Firm A is one of the four largest global accounting firms
offering audit, assurance, consulting, and tax services. The local office that performs the Cost Saver audit has extensive experience
auditing companies in the retail industry, but Cost Saver is one of the local office’s largest and most complex clients, especially in
terms of internal controls. Cost Saver’s move towards increasing reliance on ecommerce has further increased the importance and
complexity of the internal controls over financial reporting evaluation on the Cost Saver audit. The audit of Cost Saver has, however,
been fairly eventless and Cost Saver received a clean financial statement audit opinion and clean internal controls over financial
reporting opinion just as it has in each of the past six years.
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Were Cost Saver’s earnings better or worse than analyst expectations?

o Better (1)
o Worse (2)
Has Cost Saver’s move towards increasing reliance on ecommerce further increased the importance and complexity of the internal
controls evaluation on the Cost Saver audit?

o Yes (1)
o No (2)
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Very
Unattractive
(1)
In your
opinion,
how
attractive
of an
investment
is Cost
Saver? (1)

o

Unattractive
(2)

o

Somewhat
Unattractive
(3)

o

Neither
Attractive
nor
Unattractive
(4)

o
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Somewhat
Attractive
(5)

o

Attractive
(6)

o

Very
Attractive
(7)

o

Very
Unlikely
(1)
Assuming
you were
given
$10,000 to
invest in
the
department
store retail
industry,
how likely
are you to
invest a
portion of
this
amount in
the stock
of Cost
Saver? (1)

o

Unlikely
(2)

o

Somewhat
Unlikely
(3)

o

Neither
Likely nor
Unlikely
(4)

Somewhat
Likely (5)

o

o
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Likely (6)

o

Very
Likely (7)

o

Condition 1 - Joint and No Incident
Cybersecurity Examination
Cost Saver makes significant investments in cybersecurity to support its strategy to grow online sales. In response to increasing
public concern about cybersecurity threats, especially in the wake of highly publicized attacks at Target and Yahoo, Cost Saver
decided to make a voluntary disclosure about these investments and its cybersecurity risk management program. In the disclosure,
Cost Saver’s management asserted that Cost Saver maintained effective controls over cybersecurity risk management as described
by the criteria established by the AICPA.
Further, Cost Saver decided to hire an independent third party to perform an annual examination of the effectiveness of the controls
within the cybersecurity risk management program. Cost Saver decided to hire Big 4 Firm A, the same firm that currently performs
the audit of financial statements and related internal controls, to conduct the cybersecurity examination.
Big 4 Firm A performed the cybersecurity examination during the same time period that the financial statement and related internal
controls audit work was performed. The cybersecurity assessment resulted in a clean opinion. That is, Big 4 Firm A concluded that
management's assertion that the company maintained, in all material respects, effective internal controls over cybersecurity risk
management as of December 31, 2017, based on criteria established by the AICPA was fairly stated. The report was issued on
February 15, 2018, the same day that the financial statements were released.
As of March 8, 2018, three weeks after Cost Saver released its financial statements and cybersecurity examination disclosure and
related clean audit opinions, Cost Saver has not detected any cybersecurity incidents (breaches).
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Condition 2 - Separate and No Incident
Cybersecurity Examination
Cost Saver makes significant investments in cybersecurity to support its strategy to grow online sales. In response to increasing
public concern about cybersecurity threats, especially in the wake of highly publicized attacks at Target and Yahoo, Cost Saver
decided to make a voluntary disclosure about these investments and its cybersecurity risk management program. In the disclosure,
Cost Saver’s management asserted that Cost Saver maintained effective controls over cybersecurity risk management as described
by the criteria established by the AICPA.
Further, Cost Saver decided to hire an independent third party to perform an annual examination of the effectiveness of the controls
within the cybersecurity risk management program. Cost Saver decided to hire Big 4 Firm B, a different firm than the current
financial statement and related internal controls auditors, to conduct the cybersecurity examination.
Big 4 Firm B performed the cybersecurity examination during the same time period that the financial statement and related internal
controls audit work was performed. The cybersecurity assessment resulted in a clean opinion. That is, Big 4 Firm B concluded that
management's assertion that the company maintained, in all material respects, effective internal controls over cybersecurity risk
management as of December 31, 2017, based on criteria established by the AICPA was fairly stated. The report was issued on
February 15, 2018, the same day that the financial statements were released.
As of March 8, 2018, three weeks after Cost Saver released its financial statements and cybersecurity examination disclosure and
related clean audit opinions, Cost Saver has not detected any cybersecurity incidents (breaches).
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Condition 3 - Joint and Subsequent Cybersecurity Incident
Cybersecurity Examination
Cost Saver makes significant investments in cybersecurity to support its strategy to grow online sales. In response to increasing
public concern about cybersecurity threats, especially in the wake of highly publicized attacks at Target and Yahoo, Cost Saver
decided to make a voluntary disclosure about these investments and its cybersecurity risk management program. In the disclosure,
Cost Saver’s management asserted that Cost Saver maintained effective controls over cybersecurity risk management as described
by the criteria established by the AICPA.
Further, Cost Saver decided to hire an independent third party to perform an annual examination of the effectiveness of the controls
within the cybersecurity risk management program. Cost Saver decided to hire Big 4 Firm A, the same firm that currently performs
the audit of financial statements and related internal controls, to conduct the cybersecurity examination.
Big 4 Firm A performed the cybersecurity examination during the same time period that the financial statement and related internal
controls audit work was performed. The cybersecurity assessment resulted in a clean opinion. That is, Big 4 Firm A concluded that
management's assertion that the company maintained, in all material respects, effective internal controls over cybersecurity risk
management as of December 31, 2017, based on criteria established by the AICPA was fairly stated. The report was issued on
February 15, 2018, the same day that the financial statements were released.
On March 8, 2018, three weeks after Cost Saver released its financial statements and cybersecurity examination disclosure and
related clean audit opinions, Cost Saver issued the following statement publicly: “We have detected a cybersecurity incident that
occurred in the first week of March 2018. The breach allowed criminals to gain access to sensitive customer data, including name,
birth dates, home addresses, and credit card numbers, expiration dates and security codes. We believe that up to 20 million
customer accounts were impacted.”
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Condition 4 - Separate and Subsequent Cybersecurity Incident
Cybersecurity Examination
Cost Saver makes significant investments in cybersecurity to support its strategy to grow online sales. In response to increasing
public concern about cybersecurity threats, especially in the wake of highly publicized attacks at Target and Yahoo, Cost Saver
decided to make a voluntary disclosure about these investments and its cybersecurity risk management program. In the disclosure,
Cost Saver’s management asserted that Cost Saver maintained effective controls over cybersecurity risk management as described
by the criteria established by the AICPA.
Further, Cost Saver decided to hire an independent third party to perform an annual examination of the effectiveness of the controls
within the cybersecurity risk management program. Cost Saver decided to hire Big 4 Firm B, a different firm than the current
financial statement and related internal controls auditors, to conduct the cybersecurity examination.
Big 4 Firm B performed the cybersecurity examination during the same time period that the financial statement and related internal
controls audit work was performed. The cybersecurity assessment resulted in a clean opinion. That is, Big 4 Firm B concluded that
management's assertion that the company maintained, in all material respects, effective internal controls over cybersecurity risk
management as of December 31, 2017, based on criteria established by the AICPA was fairly stated. The report was issued on
February 15, 2018, the same day that the financial statements were released.
On March 8, 2018, three weeks after Cost Saver released its financial statements and cybersecurity examination disclosure and
related clean audit opinions, Cost Saver issued the following statement publicly: “We have detected a cybersecurity incident that
occurred in the first week of March 2018. The breach allowed criminals to gain access to sensitive customer data, including name,
birth dates, home addresses, and credit card numbers, expiration dates and security codes. We believe that up to 20 million
customer accounts were impacted.”
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Post Manipulations Measures

Very
Unattractiv
e (1)
You previously indicated that the
attractiveness of an investment in Cost
Saver was
${PreAttract/ChoiceGroup/SelectedAnsw
ers}. Based on the additional
cybersecurity information you have
received since then, in your opinion, how
attractive of an investment is Cost Saver?
(1)

o

Unattractiv
e (2)

o
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Somewhat
Unattractiv
e (3)

o

Neither
Attractive
nor
Unattractiv
e (4)

o

Somewh
at
Attractive
(5)

o

Attractiv
e (6)

o

Very
Attractiv
e (7)

o

Very
Unlikely
(1)
You previously indicated that the likelihood
that you would invest in Cost Saver was
${PreInvest/ChoiceGroup/SelectedAnswers}.
Based on the additional cybersecurity
information you have received since then,
assuming you again were given $10,000 to
invest in the department store retail industry,
how likely are you to invest a portion of this
amount in the stock of Cost Saver? (1)

o

Unlikely
(2)

o
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Somewhat
Unlikely
(3)

o

Neither
Likely
nor
Unlikely
(4)

o

Somewhat
Likely (5)

o

Likely
(6)

Very
Likely
(7)

o

o

Other Measured Variables
Competence: Auditors are competent when they have relevant knowledge and the ability to use this knowledge in a specific
auditing context.
Very
Unconfident
(1)

Unconfident
(2)

Somewhat
Unconfident
(3)

Neither
Confident
nor
Unconfident
(4)

Somewhat
Confident
(5)

Confident
(6)

Very
Confident
(7)

How confident are you
in Big 4
Firm ${e://Field/Firm}'s
competence in Cost
Saver's
cybersecurity
examination? (1)

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

How confident are you
in Big 4 Firm
A's competence in
Cost Saver's financial
statement and related
internal controls
audit? (2)

o

o

o

o

o

o

o
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Independence: Auditors are independent when they act with integrity and objectivity, and without biases, and when they do not give
in to pressure from management.
Very
Unconfident
(1)

Unconfident
(2)

Somewhat
Unconfident
(3)

Neither
Confident
nor
Unconfident
(4)

Somewhat
Confident
(5)

Confident
(6)

Very
Confident
(7)

How confident
are you that Big
4 Firm
${e://Field/Firm}
acted
independently
when
performing
Cost Saver’s
cybersecurity
examination?
(1)

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

How confident
are you that Big
4 Firm A acted
independently
when
performing
Cost Saver's
financial
statement and
related internal
controls audit?
(2)

o

o

o

o

o

o

o
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Quality: How confident are you that sufficient evidence was obtained and used to support:
Very
Unconfident
(1)

Unconfident
(2)

Somewhat
Unconfident
(3)

Neither
Confident
nor
Unconfident
(4)

Somewhat
Confident
(5)

Confident
(6)

Very
Confident
(7)

Big 4
Firm ${e://Field/Firm}’s clean
opinion that the
cybersecurity controls are
effective and designed as
described by Cost
Saver? (1)

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

Big 4 Firm A’s clean opinion
that Cost Saver maintained
effective internal controls
over financial reporting? (2)

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

Big 4 Firm A’s clean opinion
that the financial
statements faithfully
represent Cost Saver’s
underlying economics? (3)

o

o

o

o

o

o

o
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Manipulation Checks

Was the audit firm providing the cybersecurity examination the same audit firm providing the financial statement audit and related
internal controls audit?

o Yes (1)
o No (2)

Did Cost Saver report a cybersecurity incident (breach)?

o Yes (1)
o No (2)
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PEQ

How many times have you purchased or sold individual stock or mutual funds?
________________________________________________________________

How many accounting or finance courses have you taken?
________________________________________________________________

How many years of work experience do you have?
________________________________________________________________
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How many times have you made online purchases in the last 3 months?

o Never (1)
o 1-3 times (2)
o 4-6 times (3)
o More than 6 times (4)

How many times have you made in-store purchases at a department store in the last 3 months?

o Never (1)
o 1-3 times (2)
o 4-6 times (3)
o More than 6 times (4)
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Have you ever been a victim of identity theft or credit card fraud?

o Yes (1)
o No (2)

What is your age?
________________________________________________________________

What is your gender?

o Female (1)
o Male (2)
o Prefer not to answer (3)
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Appendix B: Experimental Instrument for Essay 2

Instructions: Please assume the role of a potential investor and carefully consider all the information in the following case before
answering the questions that follow.

Regulatory Background
This section provides you with background information on cybersecurity to inform you of recent guidance from U.S. regulators.
On February 21, 2018, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) issued new guidance for public company cybersecurity
disclosures to include descriptions of cybersecurity incidents and actions taken to manage and reduce cybersecurity risk.
One of the leading frameworks for helping organizations manage and reduce cybersecurity risk is the NIST Cybersecurity
Framework. The framework includes the following five essential functions:
Identify:
Understanding of the business, risk assessment, and governance.
Protect:
Processes, controls, and technology to protect information.
Detect:
Vulnerability scans and continuous monitoring to detect security events.
Respond: Response planning, analysis, and mitigation.
Recover:
Recovery planning, communications, and improvements.
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Comprehension Questions
Which of the following functions is not included in the NIST Cybersecurity Framework?

o Protect
o Respond
o Recover
o Eliminate
Vulnerability scans is an example of which NIST Cybersecurity Framework function?

o Detect
o Recover
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Cost Saver Background
This section provides background information, including the most recent fiscal year-end financial information and e-commerce
strategy, about a company that you are considering investing in.
Cost Saver Inc.
(NYSE MKT: CSVR)
Profile Description:
Cost Saver Corporation operates a national chain of discount department stores. The company is listed on NYSE and is included in
the S&P 500. Cost Saver has over 11,800 stores nationwide and is headquartered in Denver, Colorado. The company grew rapidly
in the late 1990s and early 2000s by adding additional stores. More recently, Cost Saver has been able to continue growing by
increasing online sales. Cost Saver’s e-commerce strategy is to both provide low cost and rapid delivery options to customer homes
as well as leverage its physical footprint and have customers place orders online and then pick up their purchases at a local Cost
Saver store. To drive a greater proportion of its sales through its website, Cost Saver makes it easy for in-store customers to create
online user profiles by automatically storing personal and payment information after consent from the customer.
In response to increasing public concern about cybersecurity risk and to support its e-commerce strategy, Cost Saver made the
following disclosure: “We have made significant investments in cybersecurity to support our e-commerce growth strategy.”
Key Statistics and Ratios:
Earnings Per Share (EPS)
Price to Earnings (P/E)
Return on Equity (ROE)
Sales Growth %
Analysts’ Earnings Surprise %

Cost Saver
$5.33
13.42
25.8%
3.0%
13.1%

Source: Yahoo Finance
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Industry Average
$4.31
16.58
19.4%
2.3%
4.2%

Comprehension Questions
Were Cost Saver’s earnings better or worse than analyst expectations?

o Better
o Worse
Has Cost Saver made investments in cybersecurity to support its e-commerce growth strategy?

o Yes
o No

114

Condition 1 – More Comprehensive Cybersecurity Examination and No Incident
Subsequent to the most recent fiscal year-end financial information, Cost Saver’s management issued the following statement
publicly:
“We engaged one of the world’s leading audit, tax, and advisory professional services firms to conduct a
comprehensive cybersecurity risk management program examination including collecting and evaluating evidence regarding controls
designed to perform the following five functions:
 protect information and systems from security events, and to


detect,



respond to,



mitigate, and



recover from security events that are not prevented.

We received a clean attestation opinion supporting:
 our description of our cybersecurity program including business operations and information at risk, cybersecurity objectives,
risk assessment, governance structure, communications, monitoring, and control processes, and


the effectiveness of the controls within our cybersecurity program based on the Trust Services Criteria for Security,
Availability, Processing Integrity, Confidentiality, and Privacy consistent with the attestation standards established by the
AICPA.”
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Condition 2 – Less Comprehensive Vulnerability and Penetration Test and No Incident
Subsequent to the most recent fiscal year-end financial information, Cost Saver’s management issued the following statement
publicly:
“We engaged one of the world’s leading audit, tax, and advisory professional services firms to conduct an automated vulnerability
and penetration test and to recommend solutions. The automated vulnerability and penetration test is designed to identify and
evaluate gaps in our information technology applications, hardware configurations, and operating systems that are designed to
perform the following two functions:
 prevent and


detect vulnerabilities.

We received a report detailing the results of the automated vulnerability and penetration test including:
 gaps in our information technology applications, hardware configurations, and operating systems, and


recommended solutions for closing the gaps in our information technology applications, hardware configurations, and
operating systems based on our evolving cybersecurity landscape.”
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Condition 3 – More Comprehensive Cybersecurity Examination and Incident Precedes Assurance
Subsequent to the most recent fiscal year-end financial information, Cost Saver’s management issued the following statement
publicly:
“We have detected a cybersecurity incident. The incident allowed criminals to gain access to sensitive customer data, including
name, birth dates, home addresses, and credit card numbers, expiration dates and security codes. We believe that up to 20 million
customer accounts were impacted. In response, and to position Cost Saver for the future:
We engaged one of the world’s leading audit, tax, and advisory professional services firms to conduct a comprehensive cybersecurity
risk management program examination including collecting and evaluating evidence regarding controls designed to perform the
following five functions:
 protect information and systems from security events, and to


detect,



respond to,



mitigate, and



recover from security events that are not prevented.

We received a clean attestation opinion supporting:
 our description of our cybersecurity program including business operations and information at risk, cybersecurity objectives,
risk assessment, governance structure, communications, monitoring, and control processes, and


the effectiveness of the controls within our cybersecurity program based on the Trust Services Criteria for Security,
Availability, Processing Integrity, Confidentiality, and Privacy consistent with the attestation standards established by the
AICPA.”
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Condition 4 - Less Comprehensive Vulnerability and Penetration Test and Incident Precedes Assurance
Subsequent to the most recent fiscal year-end financial information, Cost Saver’s management issued the following statement
publicly:
“We have detected a cybersecurity incident. The incident allowed criminals to gain access to sensitive customer data, including
names, birth dates, home addresses, and credit card numbers, expiration dates and security codes. We believe that up to 20 million
customer accounts were impacted. In response, and to position Cost Saver for the future:
We engaged one of the world’s leading audit, tax, and advisory professional services firms to conduct an automated vulnerability and
penetration test and to recommend solutions. The automated vulnerability and penetration test is designed to identify and evaluate
gaps in our information technology applications, hardware configurations, and operating systems that are designed to perform the
following two functions:
 prevent and


detect vulnerabilities.

We received a report detailing the results of the automated vulnerability and penetration test including:
 gaps in our information technology applications, hardware configurations, and operating systems, and


recommended solutions for closing the gaps in our information technology applications, hardware configurations, and
operating systems based on our evolving cybersecurity landscape.”

118

Dependent Variable

Very
Unattractive
(1)
In your
opinion,
how
attractive
of an
investment
is Cost
Saver?

o

Unattractive
(2)

o

Somewhat
Unattractive
(3)

o

Neither
Attractive
nor
Unattractive
(4)

o
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Somewhat
Attractive
(5)

o

Attractive
(6)

o

Very
Attractive
(7)

o

Very
likely to
invest in
Peers (1)
Assuming
you were
given
$10,000 to
invest in
the
department
store retail
industry,
what is the
likelihood
that you
will invest
in Cost
Saver
relative to
its peers in
the
department
store retail
industry?

o

Likely to
invest in
Peers (2)

o

Somewhat
likely to
invest in
Peers (3)

o

Indifferent
between
investing
in Peers
or Cost
Saver (4)

Somewhat
likely to
invest in
Cost
Saver (5)

o

o

120

Likely to
invest in
Cost
Saver (6)

o

Very
likely to
invest in
Cost
Saver (7)

o

Measured Variables
How would you rate the quality of the ${e://Field/Assurance} in assessing Cost Saver's ability to:
Very Low
Quality
(1)

Low
Quality
(2)

Somewhat
Low
Quality (3)

Neither
High nor
Low
Quality
(4)

Somewhat
High
Quality (5)

High
Quality
(6)

Very
High
Quality
(7)

a. prevent
future
cybersecurity
incidents?

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

b. recover
from future
cybersecurity
incidents
that are not
prevented?

o

o

o

o

o

o

o
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Very
Incompetent
(1)
How would
you rate the
competence
of Cost
Saver’s
management
related to
actions taken
to manage
and reduce
cybersecurity
risk?

o

Incompetent
(2)

o

Somewhat
Incompetent
(3)

Neither
Competent
nor
Incompetent
(4)

o

o
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Somewhat
Competent
(5)

o

Competent
(6)

o

Very
Competent
(7)

o

Very
Untrustworthy
(1)
How would you rate
the trustworthiness
of Cost Saver’s
management related
to actions taken to
manage and reduce
cybersecurity risk?

o

Untrustworthy
(2)

o

Somewhat
Untrustworthy
(3)

o
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Neither
Trustworthy
nor
Untrustworthy
(4)

o

Somewhat
Trustworthy
(5)

o

Trustworthy
(6)

o

Very
Trustworthy
(7)

o

Manipulation Checks
Which cybersecurity service did Cost Saver’s management engage the professional services firm to conduct?

o A vulnerability and penetration test
o A cybersecurity risk management program examination
Did Cost Saver's management report a cybersecurity incident?

o No. Cost Saver's management did not report a cybersecurity incident.
o Yes. The cybersecurity incident impacted over 20 million customer accounts.
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Post Experiment Questions
How many times have you purchased or sold individual stocks or mutual funds?
________________________________________________________________

How many accounting or finance courses have you taken?
________________________________________________________________
How many years of work experience do you have?
________________________________________________________________

How many times have you made online purchases in the last 3 months?

o Never
o 1-3 times
o 4-6 times
o More than 6 times
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How many times have you made in-store purchases at a department store in the last 3 months?

o Never
o 1-3 times
o 4-6 times
o More than 6 times
Have you ever been a victim of identity theft or credit card fraud?

o Yes
o No
What is your age?
________________________________________________________________
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Gender What is your gender?

o Female
o Male
o Prefer not to answer

127

Appendix C: IRB Letter for Essay 1
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Appendix D: IRB Letter for Essay 2
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